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THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL VERSUS THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL IN A CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT-
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE CASE -
RONALD K. NOBLE*
INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes the tension that exists between two impor-
tant federal statutes when they are triggered by sensitive and deli-
cate prosecutions of high-ranking members of the Executive Branch
and other officials who, in the course of their legal defense, reveal
classified information. The first statute, the Independent Counsel
Statute ("IC Statute"), was passed in 1978 in response to the uneth-
ical and criminal behavior of high-ranking members of the Nixon
administration during the Watergate scandal.' The IC Statute re-
moves responsibility for investigation and prosecution of high-rank-
ing members of the Executive Branch from the Department of
Justice, and transfers these functions to an Independent Counsel
t Copyright 0 1992 Ronald K. Noble.
* Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. J.D.,1982, Stanford
Law School; B.A., 1979, University of New Hampshire. I am grateful to Professors Anthony
Amsterdam, Vicki Been, Graham Hughes, James Jacobs and William Nelson of the New
York University School of Law, the Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Craig Bleifer, Eric Leon and Michael Lowe, students
at the New York University School of Law, for their incisive criticism and enthusiasm through
many drafts. This article discusses in part the conflict between the Independent Counsel and
the Attorney General concerning classified information in connection with the Iran-Contra
cases of Oliver North and Joseph Fernandez. The author, while on leave from the New York
University School of Law, represented the Department of Justice on matters of classified
information in these cases. Although that experience provoked the author's interest in this
topic, all research on and writing of this article occurred after the author's departure from
the Department of Justice. The views set forth in this article do not reflect the views of the
Department of Justice. The Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg res4arch fund at the
New York University School of Law provided financial support for this article.
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, I} 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-
73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 529, 591-599 (1988)).
539
540	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:539
appointed by the Judiciary. The IC Statute thus aims to ensure that
high-ranking members of the Executive Branch suspected of crim-
inal wrongdoing do not receive preferential treatment by that
branch. 2
The second statute, the Classified Information Procedures Act
("CIPA"), was enacted in 1975 to prevent defendants from frus-
trating otherwise legitimate prosecutions by engaging in a form of
‘`graymail." 3 This type of graymail occurs when a defendant threat-
ens to disclose classified information at trial, 4
 and the government,
fearing such public disclosure, decides to drop the charges against
the defendant. Thus, like the IC Statute, CIPA is designed to bolster
public confidence in the administration of criminal justice by en-
suring that individuals who work with classified information—often
members of the Executive Branch whose jobs require the highest
levels of public trust—cannot make themselves immune from crim-
inal prosecution. 5
 CIPA is also designed to safeguard national se-
curity by preventing the uncontrolled release of classified infor-
mation at trial.
At the respective times that the IC Statute and CIPA were
passed, no one considered the posgibility that serious problems of
harmonization would arise if both statutes were triggered in the
same case. 6
 Neither statute refers to the other, nor is there any
guidance concerning the respective powers of the Independent
2
 Congress has recognized that 'Nile President and the Attorney General must have
policy control to make discretionary enforcement decisions. However, where the alleged
criminal conduct of high-level administration officials is involved, this argument must bow
to the fundamental principle that no [person] can be a prosecutor or judge in [her] own
case." S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,
9221.
' Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988)).
4
 The threatened disclosure may be either the result of "unscrupulous or questionable
conduct" by a defense attorney, who seeks to disclose dassified information regardless of its
relevance, or the legitimate need for exculpatory information. S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296-98. The type of defendant in
the best position to threaten the release of classified information is the government official
who has worked on classified matters.
5 Because CIPA gives the government the opportunity to contest relevance and admis-
sibility and propose substitutions prior to trial, the government will consider dismissing only
those cases in which the classified information must be disclosed. This has the effect of
preventing the charges from being dropped against a defendant who really does not need
classified information for his defense, and who was merely attempting to graymail the
government with unnecessary disclosures.
6 I will refer to such a case as a "CIPA-IC Statute" case.
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Counsel and the Attorney General where both statutes are operat-
ing in the same case.? This omission creates a conflict that first
surfaced in the Iran-Contra prosecutions. 8
In two recent cases, United States v. Northg and United States v.
Ferriandez,'° a conflict arose between the Independent Counsel and
the Department of Justice concerning the potential public disclosure
of classified information. In North, the district court ruled that
classified information could be disclosed at trial unless the Inde-
pendent Counsel filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the dis-
trict court's ruling or the Attorney General filed a CIPA section 6(e)
affidavit barring disclosure of the classified information on national
security grounds."
The Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh, decided that it
was not in the best interest of the case to appeal the district court's
ruling. The Attorney General thereafter asked the Independent
Counsel to file an immediate interlocutory appeal, in order to pro-
tect national security. In both cases, Independent Counsel Walsh
refused,' 2 taking the position that the IC Statute transferred to the
Independent Counsel all of the Department of Justice's investigative
and prosecutorial powers except the power to authorize wiretaps.
Walsh considered an appeal of the rulings on classified information
a prosecutorial function. Therefore, in cases governed by the IC
Statute and CIPA, Walsh argued that only the Independent Counsel
could appeal such adverse rulings."
' 
The court in United States v. Fernandez stated that Irlesolution of this controversy
requires us to construe both CIPA and the Ethics in Government Act [the IC Statute], neither
of which refers to the other." 887 F.2d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1989). The IC Statute refers to the
powers of the "Independent Counsel" while CIPA refers to the powers of the "Attorney
General" and "the United States."
8 The officials who were prosecuted included Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, CIA
Chief of Station Joseph Fernandez, CIA official Thomas Clines and National Security Advisor
John Poindexter.
9 United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441 (D.D.C. 1989).
E 0 United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1989).
" See North, 713 F. Supp. at 1442. Likewise, the Fernandez court agreed that the Inde-
pendent Counsel had the sole right to file an interlocutory appeal. The Attorney General
could not file an interlocutory appeal, but had the right to file a CIPA § 6(e) affidavit. See
Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 470-71.
12 See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 467; North, 713 F. Supp. at 1441. In a non-IC Statute case,
this situation would never arise. Any CIPA dispute within the Executive Branch would always
be resolved inside the Executive Branch, ultimately by the President. In an IC Statute case,
even though the Independent Counsel is technically discharging Executive Branch functions
and is an inferior officer of the Executive Branch, he need not follow the directives of the
Attorney General or the President.
" See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 467; North, 713 F. Supp. at 1441.
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Attorney General Richard Thornburgh disagreed, contending
that CIPA provides two separate mechanisms to protect classified
information from public disclosure." The first involves an interlo-
cutory appeal of any court rulings that would result in public dis-
closure of classified information. 15 The Attorney General argued
that in an IC Statute case, the power to appeal is shared by the
Attorney General and the Independent Counsel. The second pro-
tective mechanism involves the filing of an affidavit with the trial
court, opposing public disclosure on national security grounds.'P
The Attorney General argued that such an affidavit should not be
filed until all interlocutory appeals had been exhausted.
Thus, the stage was set for what one news service described as
the battle of the "Titans"—the Independent Counsel versus the
Attorney General. Indeed, "[i]n a moment fraught with tension, a
[Department of Justice lawyer] walked to the bench in the midst of
jury selection and handed [the trial judge in North] a copy of the
stay request filed with the appeals panel." 17 Many saw the Executive
Branch's decision to interrupt the North trial as an attempt to use
national security as a pretext to prevent both the prosecution of
one of its own and the embarrassment of the President.' 8 The
' 4 See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 467, 469; North, 713 F. Supp. at 1441. The Attorney General
and the Department of Justice identified the CIPA 6(c) substitution of classified information
power and the CIPA § 7(a) interlocutory appeal power as two separate mechanisms for
protecting classified information. The Attorney General believed that he also represented
"the United States" for purposes of CI PA. See infra section II.C.
'' See 18 U.S.C. app. § 7 (1988).
26 See id. app. § 6(e). The Fernandez court held that the power to file a § 6(e) affidavit is
the Attorney General's alone. Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 467-68. Although Independent Counsel
Walsh never challenged the Attorney General's claimed exclusive right to file a § 6(e) affidavit,
this issue might arise in future CIPA-IC Statute cases.
17 Glen Craney, Secret Documents at Issue: Justice Department Tries to Delay North Trial,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Feb. 11, 1989, at 273.
'" One reporter described the interruption of the Oliver North trial by the Justice
Department this way:
It was a scene right out of 'Lonesome Dove,' the mega-Western where the
good guys always rode up in the nick of time. Just as the jury was about to be
sworn in, just as Oliver North was, finally, about to advance to the dock, a posse
of Justice Department lawyers came galloping into Judge Gerhard Gesell's
courtroom, crying 'Jest a clanged minute here.'
The Justice Department, which has had only 11 months or so to study
classified documents that are to be used in the trial, had suddenly come to,
clapped its hand to its brow and all but fainted at the thought that Oliver North,
patriot and hero to two presidents, might go on the stand and tell the public
some intelligence secrets that could bring the republic crashing down around
our ears.
Mary McGrory, Thornburgh Comes Late to 011ie's Rescue, NEWSDAY, Feb. 10, 1989, at 80.
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prosecution of a former high-ranking member of the Executive
Branch had been interrupted by the very Executive Branch that
Congress, in enacting the IC Statute, had disqualified from inves-
tigating and prosecuting the case.
In the North and Fernandez cases, the courts rejected the Attor-
ney General's position that his office retained power under CIPA
to appeal court rulings permitting disclosure of classified informa-
tion. The courts held that the Independent Counsel could prevent
disclosure of classified information only by successfully appealing
adverse court rulings, while the Attorney General could prevent
the public disclosure of classified information only by filing a CIPA
section 6(e) affidavit."
The lack of coordination between CIPA and the 1C Statute,
and the division of CIPA powers between the Independent Counsel
and the Attorney General, have produced two results that frustrate
the purposes of Congress in enacting these statutes. First, the con-
tinued ability of the Executive Branch to protect itself from prose-
cution by controlling classified information undermines CIPA's goal
of eliminating de facto immunity for members of the government
who handle classified information. Similarly, control of classified
information is a tool that can potentially be used to circumvent the
entire Independent Counsel process, as it puts the Executive Branch
in a position of judging whether or not one of its own is prosecuted.
Second, the courts' prohibition of intervention by the Executive
Branch to appeal issues of admissibility and relevance under CIPA
forces that branch to act in an arguably suspicious manner; the
Executive may potentially, and prematurely, file a CIPA section 6(e)
affidavit when the Independent Counsel refuses to appeal adverse
L9 See United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441,1441-42 (D,D.C. 1989). The district
court confronted the standing to appeal question in the context of the Attorney General's
request to stay the trial of Oliver North, pending resolution of the issue by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court rejected the Attorney
General's stay request, concluding that the Attorney General's position on standing to appeal
was frivolous. The court held that CIPA and the IC Statute provided the Attorney General
only with the standing to file a § 6(e) affidavit. Similarly, in Fernandez, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the IC Statute transferred all of the
Department of Justice's CIPA powers to the Independent Counsel, save the Attorney Gen-
eral's power to file a 6(e) affidavit to prevent public disclosure of classified information on
national security grounds. 887 F.2d at 470-71. Once filed, the § 6(e) affidavit prevents the
public disclosure of the identified classified information.
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CIPA rulings. Because the decision to file a section 6(e) affidavit to
prevent the release of classified information will appear self-inter-
ested, such filing will frustrate the IC Statute's goal of fostering
public confidence in decisions made during the prosecution of high-
ranking members of the Executive Branch. Alternatively, in order
to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Executive Branch may
release classified information that could threaten national security.
This article will demonstrate that a forum is needed wherein
the Independent Counsel and the Attorney General can resolve
disputes concerning the potential public disclosure of classified in-
formation. To that end, this article proposes the creation of an
Office of Independent Special Arbiter ("ISA") for classified infor-
mation that would be a step toward harmonizing the IC Statute and
CIPA.
The ISA would be a private attorney qualified to make decisions
regarding classified information and national security. The appoint-
ment process would be the same as for the Independent Counsel
except that, once appointed, the ISA would issue advisory opinions
on whether the release of the classified information would threaten
national security. These opinions would be made public, but would
not bind the Executive Branch; the Attorney General could still file
a CIPA section 6(e) affidavit to prevent public disclosure. Never-
theless, the Executive Branch's decision to prevent the public dis-
closure of classified information in the face of an ISA opinion that
such disclosure would not threaten national security could be de-
nounced by the public at the election polls.
To give the background for this proposal, Section 1 of the
article describes the basic structure of the IC Statute and CIPA and
the tension between the two statutes that emerged during the Iran-
Contra trials. Section II argues that when these two statutes operate
simultaneously in criminal proceedings, they bring out each other's
weaknesses and actually work to undermine, not ensure, public
confidence, as illustrated in North and Fernandez. Such simultaneous
operation also works to endanger, rather than safeguard, national
security. Section III explains how the goals of CIPA and the IC
Statute are jeopardized in an CIPA-IC Statute case, and concludes
by demonstrating that wise policy warrants the rejection of all po-
tential solutions under the current CIPA-IC Statute framework.
Section IV develops in detail a proposal for creating an Office of
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE AND
THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT
A. The Independent Counsel Statute
In 1978, Congress created the office of Independent Counse1 2°
to investigate and prosecute criminal activity by high-ranking mem-
bers of the Executive Branch. 2 ' The so-called Independent Counsel
Statute ("IC Statute") is a provision of the Ethics in Government
Act, which remedies problems such as those that arose during the
investigation and prosecution of high-ranking government officials
in the Nixon administration,22 especially President Nixon's firing of
the Watergate Special Prosecutor."
An Independent Counsel is a private attorney appointed by
the court to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute in the
22 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824,
1867-73 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. ## 49, 529, 591-599 (1988)). The Ethics
in Government Act 1982 amendments changed the name of the "special prosecutor" of the
original 1978 Act to "independent counsel" in order to "remove the Watergate connotation"
and to "spare the subject of such investigation adverse public reaction." S. REP. No. 496,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3554.
21 The original version of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ("the Act") covered
120 authorized federal executive positions; this number was reduced to 70 in 1982. The
original Act covered such persons as the Director of Staff for the First Lady. The drafters
were concerned about excessive triggering of the Act, which causes "extreme expense and
stigma" to the subject of Independent Counsel investigations. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3543, The Act covers executive
officers including the President, Vice President, Cabinet members, top Department of Justice
officials and the heads of the CIA and the IRS. See 28 U.S.C. 591(b). In addition, the "catch
all" # 591(c) authorizes the Attorney General to trigger the statute for persons not specifically
enumerated in § 591(14 in situations where an investigation by the Department of Justice
would create an actual or perceived conflict of interest. This was the section that led to the
appointment of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh for the Iran-Contra investigation.
22 S. REP, No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,
4221-23.
23 The so-called "Saturday Night Massacre" occurred when President Nixon directed
Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Archibald Cox, who had been appointed Special
Prosecutor in the Watergate matter. Cox was fired for trying to force President Nixon to
turn over tape recordings and notes of presidential conversations relevant to Cox's investi-
gation. Rather than fire Cox, Richardson and his Deputy Attorney General resigned. Cox
was finally dismissed by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork. See Constance O'Keefe &
Peter Safirstein, Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An
Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 Bitoox. L. REv. 113, 117-18 (1982). Eventually Leon
Jaworski was appointed Special Prosecutor, with assurances of freedom from the Executive
Branch set forth in a formal regulation. See S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4218 (referring to 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739, as amended by
38 Fed. Reg. 32,805 (1974)).
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name of the United States alleged violations of federal criminal
law. 24
 Under the IC Statute, an Independent Counsel is technically
part of the Executive Branch and is expected to follow Department
of Justice policy. 25
 At the same time, however, the Independent
Counsel also remains "independent" of such policy. 26 Once ap-
pointed, 27 an Independent Counsel has "full power and indepen-
dent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial func-
tions and powers of the Department of Justice" 28 with respect to all
24
 It should be noted that the use of private attorneys to prosecute is not unique to cases
involving Executive Branch conflicts. In Young v. United States ex rd Vuitton et Fils, 481
U.S. 787, 793-96 (1987), the Court upheld the federal district court's use of private attorneys
to prosecute contempt actions.
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 594(f). The drafters of the original bill apparently believed that
whether the Independent Counsel follows Department of Justice policy is a matter of the
Independent Counsel's own discretion and that the "section should be interpreted more as
a goal than as a command." S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4285-86. Furthermore, the committee emphasized that the court will
not supervise or judge the discretion of the Independent Counsel. Id. at 71, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4287.
The 1982 Amendments to the Act changed the standard for following Department of
Justice policy from "to the extent the special prosecutor deems appropriate" to "except where
not possible." This was an attempt to ensure application of the uniform standards of the
Department of Justice "unless extenuating circumstances exist." See S. REP. No. 496, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537,1552. The drafters, however,
were careful to point out that "[Otis section should not be interpreted to mean that failure
of the special prosecutor to follow Departmental policies would constitute grounds for
removal of the special prosecutor by the Attorney General. Such an interpretation would
seriously compromise the special prosecutor's independence." Id. at 16, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3552; see also 28 U.S.C. 594(1).
26 28 U.S.C.	 599(i) states that "lejach independent counsel appointed under this
chapter, and the persons appointed by that independent counsel under subsection (c), are
separate from and independent of the Department of Justice for purposes of sections 202
through 209 of title 18."
27 Under the Act, the Independent Counsel is appointed by a Special Division Court.
See 28 U.S.C. 592(c)(1). The Special Division consists of three judges who serve staggered
two-year terms, designated by the Chief Justice of the United States, and who are drawn
from a pool including retired U.S. Supreme Court Justices and senior judges on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. See id. 49. The judiciary has the power to appoint executive officers
under the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Special Division's proper
name is the "Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels," and was created
by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 602(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-
75 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. MI 49, 529, 591-99 (1988)).
22 28 U.S.C. 594(a). The Independent Counsel's powers include:
(I) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other investigations ... (3)
appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in which such
independent counsel participates in an official capacity ... (6) receiving appro-
priate national security clearances and, if necessary, contesting in court ... any
claim of privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on grounds of national
security . . . and (9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of
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matters under the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction, as defined
by the Special Division Court ("Special Division") that appointed
the Independent Counsel. 29
The IC Statute attempts to address the fundamental law en-
forcement problem of how to assure fair handling of investigations
and prosecutions of high-ranking members of the Executive
Branch." The IC Statute aims to ensure public confidence in the
investigation and prosecution of possible offenses by high-ranking
members of the Executive Branch by eliminating real or apparent
conflicts of interest in the investigation and prosecution of such
matters." Until the passage of the IC Statute, no formal statutory
mechanism existed for the appointment of an Independent Coun-
sel, although the practice of discretionary appointments of Inde-
pendent Counsel had been established well before the Watergate
scandals."
The IC Statute creates a two-step process by which information
and allegations against government officials are screened before the
competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations,
and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States.
Id.
" See id. The Attorney General can request that the Special Division expand the juris-
diction of the Independent Counsel, either on the Attorney General's own initiative, or upon
the request of the Independent Counsel, after discovering or receiving information about
persons not covered by the original grant of jurisdiction. See id. § 593(c). The Independent
Counsel may also ask the Attorney General to refer to her other matters related to her
jurisdiction. See id. § 594(e).
Mi The Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982 recognized the conflict inherent
in circumstances where the Attorney General is called on to investigate the Executive Branch;
the Attorney General "is a political appointee of the President, at times a close advisor to the
President, and part of an Administration that may aspire to reelection or have other political
objectives." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3540. '''The basic purpose of the
special prosecutor provisions is to promote public confidence in the impartial investigation
of alleged wrongdoing by government officials." Id. For a discussion of public confidence
and its importance as an impetus for the enactment of the IC Statute, see Carl Levin, The
Independent Counsel State: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16 HovsTRA
L. REV. 11 (1987).
31 See infra section II.C. The appointment of an Independent Counsel removes the
suspicion that would follow any prosecutorial decision by the Attorney General beneficial to
a high-ranking member of the Executive Branch. For example,
The use of an (Independent Counsel] .. would result in public acceptance of
a decision not to prosecute that may be entirely justified on the merits; whereas
the same decision made by an Attorney General who has a conflict of interest,
or the appearance thereof, might breed public distrust of the decision not to
prosecute.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4223.
" See id. at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4218; see also O'Keefe & Safirstein,
supra note 23, at 116 n.16.
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appointment of an Independent Counsel. First, the Attorney Gen-
eral is required to conduct a threshold inquiry whenever "the At-
torney General receives information sufficient to constitute grounds
to investigate whether any person [covered by the Act]" may have
violated any federal criminal law other than a violation classified as
a class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction." 34 The purpose of this
threshold inquiry is to determine whether a preliminary investiga-
tion is necessary. In determining whether to go forward with a
preliminary investigation, the Attorney General considers only the
specificity of the information received and the credibility of its
source.35 If within the fifteen days after the information concerning
an alleged criminal violation is received, the Attorney General de-
termines that the specificity or credibility requirement is not met,
then the Attorney General must close the matter."
Second, if within that fifteen day period the Attorney General
determines that the information is specific and from a credible
source, the Attorney General should commence a preliminary in-
vestigation." During a preliminary investigation the Attorney Gen-
eral's ordinary investigative powers are limited; the Attorney Gen-
eral has no authority to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant
immunity or issue subpoenas. 38 Additionally, the Attorney General
is not permitted to conclude that information about a violation of
criminal law by a person is not specific and from a credible source
merely because that person lacked the state of mind required for
the violation of criminal law." Finally, the Attorney General shall
not base a determination that "there are no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted, upon a determina-
tion that the person under investigation lacked the state of mind
required for the violation of [the specific] criminal law involved,
" See supra note 21.
34 28 U.S.C. 591(a). The Attorney General must also conduct a threshold inquiry in
response to requests by Congress to conduct a preliminary investigation. See id. § 592(g)(1)
(providing that "itlhe committee on the Judiciary of either House of the Congress, or a
majority of majority party members or a majority of all non-majority party members of either
such committee; may request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment
of an independent counsel").
" Id. § 59I(d).
Id. § 59 1(d)(2).
" Id. Even if the "Attorney General is unable to determine, within that 15 day period,
whether the information is specific and from a credible source, the Attorney General shall,
at the end of that 15 day period, commence a preliminary investigation with respect to that
information." Id.
w Id. § 592(a)(2).
" Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i)•
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unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the person lacked
such state of mind." 40
If upon completion of the preliminary investigation the Attor-
ney General determines that no reasonable grounds exist to believe
that further investigation is warranted, the Attorney General must
promptly notify the Special Division Court, which has no power to
appoint an Independent Counsel with respect to the matters in-
volved.4 ' The IC Statute also makes clear that decisions by the
Attorney General not to apply for appointment of an Independent
Counsel are not reviewable. 42 If the Attorney General determines
that further investigation and appointment of an Independent
Counsel is not necessary, the Attorney General must report the
decision to the Special Division, 45 or, if appropriate, Congress.44
If, however, the Attorney General determines that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted45 or the applicable time periods during which to make
such determination have elapsed,46 then the Attorney General can
apply to the Special Division for the appointment of an Indepen-
dent Counsel. 47 Upon the application of the Attorney General, the
Special Division must appoint and define the prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion of an Independent Counsel. 48 The Department of Justice pro-
vides the Special Division with a list of names from which it can
4° Id.	 592(a)(B)(ii).
41 Id.	 592(b)(1).
47 See id. § 592(f ).
45 See id. 592(6).
" See id. § 592(g)(2). Section 592(g)(2) provides:
Not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request thy Congress to conduct a
preliminary investigation], the Attorney General shall submit, to the committee
making the request, or to the committee on which the persons making the
request serve, a report on whether the Attorney General has begun or will
begin a preliminary investigation under this chapter of the matters with respect
to which the request is made.
Id. Significantly, the Act does not require the Attorney General to give an explanatory report
to either the Special Division or Congress if it is determined during the threshold inquiry
that an actual preliminary investigation is not required. Obviously, whenever the Attorney
General decides not to conduct a preliminary investigation of a covered member of the
Executive Branch and the public learns of that decision, public suspicion will be immediately
aroused. This loophole in the IC Statute is often criticized as permitting mischief on the part
of the Executive Branch.
45
 28 U.S.C. 592(c)(1).
46 The Attorney General has 90 days to conduct the preliminary investigation under 28
U.S.C. § 592(a)(1), but may apply to the Special Division for a 60-day extension under
§ 592(a)(3).
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select an Independent Counsel. The Special Division, however, is
not bound by this list and instead may appoint an Independent
Counsel of its own choosing."
Finally, the IC Statute provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, an Independent Counsel appointed under
this chapter shall have . . . full power and independent authority
to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers
of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other
officer or employee of the Department of Justice." 5° The Indepen-
dent Counsel possesses a number of powers: to investigate person(s)
within the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction; to convene a grand
jury; to litigate criminal or civil cases; to appeal adverse rulings; to
apply for grants of immunity for potential witnesses; to seek in-
dictments from the appropriate grand juries; to control the prose-
cution of defendants; to negotiate plea agreements; to dismiss in-
dividual counts or entire indictments; and to hire all appropriate
personnel. 51 The IC Statute's language expressly reserves for the
Attorney General alone the power to "exercise direction or control
as to those matters that specifically require the Attorney General's
personal action under section 2516 of title 18 [authorization for
interception of wire, oral or electronic communication]." 52
B. Classified Information Procedures Act
Prior to the enactment of the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act ("CIPA")," the government had to choose between allow-
ing public disclosure of classified information and dismissing pend-
ing criminal charges, without knowing how the court would rule on
admissibility, in federal criminal cases touching on national security
matters.54 CIPA ensures that issues of relevancy and admissibility
42 "Any application for the appointment of an Independent Counsel under this chapter
shall contain sufficient information to assist the [Special Division] in selecting an Independent
Counsel." Id. § 592(d). In practice, the Department of Justice provides the Special Division
with a list of up to ten individuals, and the Special Division makes its selection and advises
the Department of Justice accordingly.
" Id.
51 For a more detailed list of examples of the Independent Counsel's power, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 594(a)(1)—(10)(c).
52 Id. § 599(a).
53 Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §1 1-15 (1988).
54 Prior to the enactment of CIPA, a criminal defendant could force the government to
, dismiss the case against her by threatening to disclose classified information at trial. If the
classified information was sufficiently sensitive, the government would not take the risk that
the court would find the information relevant when the government objected to it at trial.
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can be resolved during the pre-trial stage. In addition, CIPA permits
the Attorney General, pursuant to section 6(e) of the Act, to file an
affidavit to prevent the public disclosure of classified information
on national security grounds.
Classified information55 is potentially very important in the
prosecution of espionage and other crimes committed by members
of the Executive Branch, whose daily operations often involve the
handling of such information. In these cases, a defendant may claim
that the classified information is essential to his or her defense.
Either the indictments will charge the defendant with a crime in-
volving classified information, or the defendant will seek to intro-
duce classified information to prove his or her innocence. 56 The
aim of CIPA is to allow for the prosecution of cases that were
previously difficult or impossible to pursue because of the threat of
disclosure of classified information: cases like the Iran-Contra pros-
Consequently, in such a situation the government would often dismiss the charges against
the defendant.
55 "'Classified information' refers to information or material classified pursuant to Ex-
ecutive Order as Top Secret,' 'Secret,' or 'Confidential.'" JOHN N. MOORE ET AL, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 1064 (1990) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 167 (1982), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)). "Classified information" is defined as information, the disclosure
of which "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security." Id. Section 1.3
of Executive Order 12,356 lists the kinds of information that are potentially classifiable. See
Exec. Order 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). CIPA 1(a)
specifically defines classified information as:
any information or material that has been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security, and
any restricted data, as defined in paragraph r of section 11 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2014(y)).
18 U.S.C. app. § 1(a). C1PA § 6 defines national security as "the national defense and the
foreign relations of the United States." Id. § 1(b); see also Exec. Order 12,356, 6.1(c), 3
C.F.R. 166, 167, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
" Many of the C1PA cases involve the so-called "CIA defense," or "apparent authority"
defense, where the defendant claims that the alleged illegal activity was committed while in
service of the United States government. This defense has been asserted in response to a
wide variety of charges. See, e.g., United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir.
1989) (securities fraud, mail fraud), as amended, 902 F.2d 18, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 64 (1990);
United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989) (espionage); United States v.
Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1989) (removal of firearms from Fort Bragg);
United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988) (exporting firearms to Afghan
rebels); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1460, 1464 (11th Cir.) (conspiracy to manu-
facture firearms), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937 (1987); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102,
1104 (4th Cir. 1985) (disclosure of classified information to Soviet Union); United States v.
Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (drug charges); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d
967, 974 (4th Cir. 1983) (conspiracy to export firearms to Libya illegally); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (D. Mass. 1988) (conspiracy to obstruct justice).
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ecutions of Oliver L. North and Joseph F. Fernandez.57 CIPA at-
tempts to accomplish this aim by "permit[ting] the government to
ascertain the potential damage to national security of proceeding
with a given prosecution before trial."58
CIPA formalized procedures for the handling of classified in-
formation in criminal cases by creating uniform guidelines to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure. CIPA's pre-trial procedures eliminate
the dilemma whereby the government may have to guess whether
the defendant will disclose certain classified information, as well as
whether such information would be found admissible at trial."
CIPA requires that defendants identify all classified information
that they intend to introduce at trial," and that the court resolve
all issues relating to the admissibility of classified information prior
to trial. 6 '
CIPA also regulates the discovery and disclosure of classified
information at pre-trial and trial proceedings. It deals with two basic
situations that threaten such disclosure in a criminal prosecution.
The first situation occurs when a defendant seeks to discover infor-
mation that is in the government's sole possession. In this situation,
the defendant has no alternative source for the information. If the
requested information is classified in whole or in part, CIPA pro-
vides the government with ways to regulate the review and potential
release of such information.
Section 4 of CIPA addresses the situation in which the defen-
dants do not have access to the physical documents that could aid
in their defense. Under section 4, the government can request that
the court not allow defendants discovery of irrelevant classified
57 Because of the large amounts of classified information involved in proving both the
prosecution and defense, the Iran-Contra case against Oliver L. North may never have been
prosecuted, and the case against Joseph F. Fernandez may never have been attempted, if the
CIPA safeguards were not available. Both North and Fernandez handled and created clas-
sified information on a daily basis in the course of their duties as members of the Executive
Branch. The North and Fernandez cases were essentially "apparent authority" cases. See United
States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (D.D.C. 1989); United States v. North, 698 F. Supp.
322, 324 (D.D.C. 1988); see also David Johnston, Case Dismissed in Contra Affair, Clearing Agent,
N.Y. TIMES, November 25, 1989, § 1, at I, 10. North claimed that "his activities were known
and authorized and he [sought] material that [would] reinforce this position." North, 698 F.
Supp. at 324. Fernandez suggested that the performance of his "legitimate duties" as an
intelligence officer caused him to be subject to a "politically motivated" prosecution. See David
Johnston, supra, § I, at 1, 10.
'8 S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294.
39 Id. at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4297.
6° See 18 U.S.C. app. § 5.
41 See id. app, § 6(a).
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information.62 The request may be in camera and ex parte,65 and the
defendant need not be given notice identifying the classified infor-
mation. 64 Upon approval, the government may delete selected por-
tions of the requested documents or provide substitutions. This
prevents the defendants from discovering classified information
that, though irrelevant to her case, could be used to graymail the
government.
The second situation in which CIPA issues can arise in a crim-
inal prosecution occurs when defendants already have classified
information in their possession. The defendants may have obtained
the information from the government during the course of the
criminal proceedings or prior to their initiation. Not unusually, the
information will have been acquired in the exercise of an official
responsibility. CIPA section 3 requires the court to issue a protective
order, upon motion of the government, to prevent defendants from
disclosing classified information that was revealed to them by the
government in the course of the case. 6' Section 3 thus gives the
government an opportunity to launch a preemptive strike to safe-
guard national security.
CIPA section 5 also prevents the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information by requiring defendants to notify the govern-
ment and the court, prior to trial, of all classified information that
defendants reasonably expect to disclose at tria1. 66 No classified
62 See id. app. § 4.
63 An in camera hearing is one that is held in the judge's chambers, or in the courtroom
without the jury or public present. An ex parte hearing is one where only the moving party
is present. Because the adverse party is not aware that an ex park hearing is being held, she
does not know what is being discussed and can take no part in addressing the relevant issues.
CIPA 4 provides that "Mlle court may permit the United States to make a request for such
authorization in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone." 18
U.S.C. app. § 4.
64 CIPA section 6(b) provides:
Before any hearing is conducted pursuant to a request by the United States
under subsection [61(a), the United States shall provide the defendant with
notice of the classified information that is at issue. Such notice shall identify the
specific classified information at issue whenever that information previously has
been made available to the defendant by the United States.
18 U.S.C. app. 6(b).
65 See id. app. 3 ("Upon motion of the United States, the court shall issue an order to
protect against the disclosure of any classified information disclosed by the United States to
any defendant in any criminal case in a district court of the United States."). The legislative
history is inconclusive as to whether the language of 4 3 limits the use of protective orders
only to items disclosed to the defendant in discovery, or whether it extends to classified
information already in the defendant's possession. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review
of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 Ass. J. CRIM. L. 277, 286-87 (1986).
645 See 18 U.S.C. app. § 5. The government can also file its own motion if it believes that
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information may be disclosed by defendants until the government
has had an opportunity to dispute its admissibility, or to file an
affidavit under section 6 preventing such disclosure, and to appeal
adverse rulings under section 7. 67 Section 5(b) provides for sanctions
by the court, which include forbidding public disclosure and striking
testimony, when defendants fail to comply with the section 5(a)
notice requirements. 68 The advance warning provided by the section
5 notice removes the possibility of surprise disclosure by defendants.
In addition, it eliminates graymail by informing the government of
the information that defendants plan to disclose, thus allowing the
government to make rational choices about whether the cost of
disclosure is worth the prospect of a conviction.
Once the government is aware that the defendants plan to
introduce classified information for their defense, the government
can attempt to prevent its disclosure. CIPA section 6 procedures
are followed when the classified information has been disclosed to
the defendants, or when the defendants already possess the classi-
fied information. Section 6 gives a step-by-step process for evalu-
ating the impact of disclosure and rulings on the admissibility of
substitute documents before the government must choose between
disclosure or dismissal of the charges. Section 6(a) provides for a
pre-trial hearing on the relevance and admissibility of the classified
information referred to in the section 5 notice. If the court finds
the classified material admissible and relevant, the government,
under section 6(c), may move to substitute summaries or statements
of admissions for classified materials. The court will approve sub-
stitutions of classified information only if the substitutions will give
the defendant "substantially the same ability to make his defense as
would disclosure" of the actual documents. 69 Section 6(c)(2) permits
the defendant would assert a defense involving classified information at trial. See 18 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2, 6. The government may not be prevented from invoking CIPA procedures at any
stage of trial. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D. Mass.
1988).
67 See United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
937 (1988).
" 18 U.S.C. app. § 5031; see also, e.g., Badia, 827 F.2d at 1464-66. In reality, however,
the striking of testimony will not do much good, as the classified information that the
government sought to protect will have been disclosed in open court.
69 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1)(B); see also, e.g., United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441,
1442 (D.D.C. 1989). In United States v. Collins, 603 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. Fla. 1985), the court
held that CIPA § 6(c) substitutions do not interfere with a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process of witnesses, or the due process rights of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 303. A defendant still retains the right to present his version of the case to the jury.
Section 6(c) merely restricts the "manner in which the story will be told." Id. at 304.
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the government to submit, in camera and ex parte, a "classification
affidavit" in conjunction with substitution proceedings under sec-
tion 6(c). 7° The affidavit explains to the court why the information
is classified and, if disclosed, why it "would cause identifiable dam-
age to the national security of the United States." 7 l
If the court denies the substitutions or summaries, the Attorney
General may then either disclose the classified information, dismiss
the charges involving classified information, or prevent disclosure
by filing an affidavit under section 6(e) stating that disclosure would
cause identifiable damage to the national security of the United
States. 72 After the filing of the section 6(e) affidavit, the court must
order the defendant not to disclose the information. 73 A presump-
tion exists that, if the information is admissible under section 6(a),
it would be unfair for the government to prevent the defendant
from using it by filing a section 6(e) affidavit. Therefore, section
6(e) also provides for dismissal of the indictment or the specific
counts related to the classified information, unless the prosecutor
can convince the court that some less drastic action is appropriate."
CIPA provides the government with another course of action
in the face of an order authorizing disclosure, sanctioning non-
disclosure, or refusing a protective order. Section 7 allows the pros-
ecutor to take an interlocutory appeal, before or during trial, on all
of these issues. The ability of the prosecutor to appeal is central to
CIPA's scheme of giving the government full consideration of all
options before reaching the choice between disclosure or dismissa1. 75
70 See 18 U.S.C. app. 6(c)(2).
" Id. If one assumes that the acceptability of a substitution should not depend on the
classified nature of the document, then "this provision appears to invite the government to
influence the court with uncontested claims about the serious nature of the information."
Tamanaha, supra note 65, at 296 n.102.
/g 18 U.S.C. app. 4 6(e).
73 See id. app. 6(e)(1).
74 C1PA 4 6(e)(2) provides:
Whenever a defendant is prevented by an order under paragraph [6(e)] (1)
from disclosing or causing the disclosure of classified information, the court
shall dismiss the indictment or information, or the court shall order such other
action, in lieu of dismissing the indictment or information, as the court deter-
mines is appropriate. Such action may include, but need not be limited to—(A)
dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information; (B) finding against
the United States on any issue as to which the excluded classified information
relates; or (C) striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness.
18 U.S.C. app. 6(e)(2).
75
 The legislative history makes this clear:
This section [7] is essential to the statutory scheme . . . . Without such a
procedure, the district court could issue an order that could have the effect of
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Indeed, it is established Department of Justice policy to file a section
6(e) affidavit only after all alternative means of preventing the
disclosure of the information have been exhausted, including sec-
tion 7 appeals." If no interlocutory appeal is taken, or if the gov-
ernment loses on appeal, then the government can either permit
disclosure of the classified information or file a CIPA section 6(e)
affidavit preventing disclosure, with the likely result that all or some
of the charges against the defendant will be dismissed.
IL THE TENSION BETWEEN THE IC STATUTE AND CIPA
Prior to United States v. North" and United States v. Fernandez,"
no occasion had arisen to determine the effect of the operation of
CIPA and the IC Statute in the same case. North and Fernandez
demonstrate that when this occurs, significant disagreement regard-
ing the conduct of the case can arise between the Attorney General
and the Independent Counsel. North and Fernandez delineate the
roles of the Independent Counsel and the Attorney General in a
CIPA-IC Statute case in such a way that the two of them are left to
"slug out" their disagreements, each having substantial power to
paralyze the other.
A. United States v. North
On March 16, 1988, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North was indicted on
fourteen counts of violating federal criminal law, including obstruc-
tion of a congressional inquiry, making false statements at a congres-
sional hearing and illegal acceptance of a gratuity." The investiga-
tion of North began when the Attorney General requested that the
making highly sensitive information public. The government would then face
a choice of disclosing information or having the case dismissed .... This section
also responds to the need to protect the defendant's interests in a speedy trial.
S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4303.
76 See Letter from Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Law-
rence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel 2 ( July 20, 1989) (on file with the author) (discussing
the position of the Department of Justice with respect to United States v. Fernandez).
77 713 F. Supp. 1436 (D.D.C. 1989).
78 887 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1989).
79 The original indictment returned against North charged him with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988) (four counts); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (four counts);
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2071(6) (1988); 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(f), (g) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (1988)); 18 U.S.C. § 654 (1988); 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (two counts). See Indictment, Criminal No. 88-0080 (D.D.C. 1987),
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Special Division of the court appoint an Independent Counsel to
investigate certain members of the Executive Branch. The Attorney
General believed that these officials were involved in the shipping
of arms to Iran as a quid pro quo for Iranian assistance in obtaining
the release of American hostages. He based this request on the
"catch all" provision of the IC Statute, which permits the Attorney
General to request the appointment of an Independent Counsel if
the Attorney General believes that investigation or prosecution by
the Department of Justice "may result in personal, financial, or
political conflict of interest."" Following the Attorney General's
request, the Special Division appointed Lawrence E. Walsh, a retired
federal judge and former Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, to investigate and prosecute North.
North sought to defend himself by claiming that his superiors,
including former President Ronald Reagan, knew of and implicitly
endorsed his conduct. To prove this "apparent authority" defense,8 '
North claimed that he needed a large number of classified docu-
ments, thus triggering CIPA. Before the trial began, however, In-
dependent Counsel Walsh dropped two counts from the indictment
because the government's disclosure of the information necessary
to prove those counts and North's disclosure of information to
defend against those counts would compromise national security.
Although the Attorney General did not formally file a CIPA section
6(e) affidavit, he would have done so had Independent Counsel
Walsh not dropped those two counts." Both the Independent
Counsel and the Attorney General agreed that dropping counts one
and two was necessary for classified information reasons."
60 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 591(c) (1988); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN,
OPENING ARGUMENTS 5 (1991) (the author was a lawyer in the office of Independent Counsel
Walsh and claims to reveal in this book the inner workings of the Independent Counsel's
office in connection with the trial of Oliver North).
81 The apparent authority defense is used most frequently by government officials who
argue that their superiors authorized or ordered the activity that later becomes the subject
of criminal prosecution. Defendants thereby hope to convince jurors that they did not intend
to commit a crime. See supra note 56.
" See infra note 88.
88 Jeffrey Toobin, a lawyer on Independent Counsel Walsh's staff, wrote:
A trial without counts one and two would allow us to shear dozens of names
from our witness list, an important advantage in a case where many of our
witnesses like the defendant far more than they care for us .... [Mlany on the
staff had been willing, even anxious, to solve our classified information problems
by dropping these counts. It would also, some of us felt, boost the chances for
a conviction in the bargain. [Independent Counsel] Walsh met with Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh on January 4, 1989, to make the deal. We would
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This agreement between the Independent Counsel and the
Attorney General dramatically demonstrates that although the In-
dependent Counsel is prosecuting the case, he does not have the
authority to order the disclosure of classified information. This
power, according to the courts that addressed the issue, is reserved
ultimately for the Attorney General." It is the Independent Coun-
sel, however, who makes the decisions concerning what charges to
bring." Because the Independent Counsel does not have control
over the outcome of the court's CIPA rulings in connection with
classified information disputes between the government and the
defendant, he must necessarily bring charges without knowing
whether he will be able to disclose, or to allow the defendant to
disclose, the evidence involving classified information." When the
drop the counts one and two, and, in return, the administration would guar-
antee that the remaining counts proceed unimpeded to trial. The deal was
announced on the following day. As Thornburgh said definitively on the tele-
vision news program "Nightline" that evening, Walsh's decision to dismiss counts
one and two meant that the case "will go to trial on the remaining dozen counts."
TOOBIN, supra note 80, at 190-91.
" See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 470-71 (4th Cir. 1989); United States
v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1436, 1441-42 (D.D.C. 1989). The North and Fernandez courts con-
cluded that the Attorney General can authorize disclosure by not filing a § 6(e) affidavit. The
Independent Counsel was deemed not to have the power to file a 6(e) affidavit. Because
the Attorney General was deemed to have exclusive power to file a § 6(e) affidavit, it is fair
to conclude that he alone has the power to authorize disclosure of classified information. Of
course, a decision by relevant entities to declassify information would make the Attorney
General's § 6(e) power moot.
85 CIPA 6(e), as currently interpreted by the courts, allows the Attorney General
essentially to retain the final authority concerning the disclosure of classified information.
The courts have interpreted this function as a non-prosecutorial function, a designation that
prevents it from being delegated to the Independent Counsel. This distinction between
prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial functions seems arbitrary, as the power to dismiss charges
would appear to be a prosecutorial function. The need For this distinction does not arise in
cases in which the Department of Justice, rather than the Independent Counsel, handles the
prosecution.
88 One reason that evidence necessary to prove a charge is not disclosed is that the
Independent Counsel and the Attorney General might not agree on whether disclosure
would jeopardize national security. If the Independent Counsel, in framing the indictment,
believes that the evidence required to prove certain counts would not jeopardize national
security, then the Independent Counsel is likely to bring those counts. The Attorney General,
however, might take a different view and conclude that disclosure of the necessary evidence
would compromise national security. Because it is the Attorney General who retains final
authority through the § 6(e) affidavit, the Attorney General might choose to prevent disclo-
sure, thereby causing counts of the indictment to be dismissed. The Independent Counsel
can always ask for the Attorney General's views before trial about the national security
implications of the public disclosure of classified information. Nevertheless, in practice there
might be strategic reasons for the Independent Counsel's not doing so, such as concern
about news leaks, maintaining her independence and having her case monitored by the
Executive Branch.
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Attorney General believes that certain evidence cannot be intro-
duced without endangering national security, the Independent
Counsel must drop the charges involving such classified information
or face a CIPA section 6(e) affidavit to prevent its disclosure. This
is what happened in the North case.
It is likely that some members of the public suspected that the
Attorney General prevented the prosecution of certain counts in
the North case for reasons other than a sincere concern for the
national security." Thus, CIPA and the IC Statute combined in the
North case to undermine public confidence that North was being
tried without regard to his special relationship with the Reagan-
Bush Administration."
CIPA and the IC Statute converged again in the North prose-
cution, this second time because the Attorney General and the
Another reason that the evidence may not be disclosable is that the Attorney General
and the Independent Counsel may assume that proposed substitutions or stipulations would
be accepted by the court. If the Independent Counsel, in framing the indictment, relied on
the assumption that the court would accept certain substitutions or stipulations, and the court
later refuses the proposals, then the Attorney General must either permit disclosure of the
classified information or file a 6(e) affidavit.
87 This author believes that public confidence can be undermined by the public's failure
to realize certain facts. Of course, propositions such as "the evidence necessary to prove a
particular charge cannot be disclosed without endangering national security" are not prop-
ositions of objective fact that all persons must agree upon. Rather, they are debatable ques-
tions of fact and judgment. Thus, even if the public knew that either the Independent
Counsel or the Attorney General had decided, ostensibly in good faith, that a particular
prosecution was inconsistent with national security interests, the public would still fear that
the judgment was being made by someone whose judgment was distorted by politics. When
prosecuting government officials, the suspicion that corruption may be perpetually present
is difficult to dispel. Under this view, the public will not have confidence in the process if it
distrusts the Attorney General.
Bo The interaction of CIPA and the IC Statute does create situations in which a sequence
of events—the Independent Counsel's bringing charges before she knows whether the evi-
dence needed to prove them can be disclosed without, in the Attorney General's judgment,
endangering national security—occurs that may appear to the public as a case of politically
motivated protectionism by the Attorney General. This problem would be eliminated if either
the Attorney General or the Independent Counsel alone made both the charging decision
and the judgment as to whether evidence needed to prove the charge could be disclosed
without compromising national security. Alternatively, the charging decision could be made
by one official after a binding decision about whether the evidence could be disclosed had
been made by another person. This would result in fewer high visibility scenarios likely to
undermine public confidence than under the present interaction of CIPA and the IC Statute.
Because charges would not be brought by the Independent Counsel, and then dropped after
the Attorney General's apparent interference, there would be fewer cases where it seems
that a corrupt Attorney General has blocked a warranted prosecution. Of course, the question
would still remain whether having fewer visible occasions of possible official political protec-
tionism is useful in reducing the actual occurrence of political protectionism or enhancing
the public's long range confidence.
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Independent Counsel could not agree whether to appeal the trial
judge's CIPA rulings that were adverse to the prosecution's case.
This scenario unfolded on the morning that North's trial was sched-
uled to begin. The trial judge had ruled that the government's
proposed statement of substitutions and summaries for classified
information was inadequate to put North in substantially the same
position he would have been in if the actual classified information
were admitted. Independent Counsel Walsh did not want to appeal
the trial judge's rulings, but Attorney General Thornburgh wanted
an appeal to be taken under CIPA.
Because CIPA is silent on the subject, and no court had yet
ruled on the issue, there was confusion about exactly who had the
power to take CIPA section 7 interlocutory appeals. Independent
Counsel Walsh took the position that he alone had the power to
take section 7 interlocutory appeals, while the Attorney General
believed that both he and the Independent Counsel had the power
to take the appeals. The Attorney General believed that District
Judge Gesell's rulings did not adequately safeguard national secu-
rity, while Independent Counsel Walsh preferred to accept Judge
Gesell's rulings and move the criminal case forward.
The Attorney General attempted to stay trial proceedings
pending a section 7 interlocutory appeal, and Independent Counsel
Walsh challenged the Attorney General's standing to appeal. In a
two page decision, District Judge Gesell ruled that the Attorney
General's "only authority at this stage is his statutory prerogative
under Section 6(e) . . . . The Attorney General's attempt to appeal
is therefore frivolous and at odds with the purposes of the laws
establishing the Independent Counsel." 89 To emphasize his concern
for Independent Counsel Walsh's freedom from the Department
of Justice, Judge Gesell ordered that "[o]nly Independent Counsel
will be recognized as responsible for the day-to-day conduct of this
case,"9° and that the Independent Counsel "may avail himself of all
rights granted to the Attorney General under CIPA except the filing
of an affidavit under § 6(e) .... The Independent Counsel has the
exclusive right under Section 7 to initiate an interlocutory appeal." 91
" United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441, 1441 (D.D.C. 1989). That same day, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed Judge Gesell's holding that the
Justice Department had no standing to request a stay. See Craney, supra note 17, at 273.
" North, 713 F. Supp. at 1442. Before this order, the Independent Counsel had already
been recognized as the sole official responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the North case.
91 Id.
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The Attorney General and the Independent Counsel subsequently
settled their dispute, 92 and the trial proceeded.
North was eventually convicted on three counts: aiding and
abetting the obstruction of Congress, accepting an illegal gratuity,
and falsifying and destroying government documents. On appeal,
the convictions were remanded to determine whether the witnesses
who testified against North had been influenced by hearing North's
testimony before Congress prior to the trial. Independent Counsel
Walsh sought review of this decision in the Supreme Court, but
certiorari was denied."
B. United States v. Fernandez
On April 24, 1989, Joseph F. Fernandez, a former CIA station
chief, was indicted by a federal grand jury convened at the request
of Independent Counsel Walsh. Fernandez was charged with two
counts of obstructing proceedings of Congress and two counts of
giving false statements, all counts arising out of the Iran-Contra
affair.94 Like North, Fernandez sought to introduce classified infor-
mation in his defense. Following the trial court's rulings permitting
disclosure of classified information, the Attorney General asked
Independent Counsel Walsh to take a CIPA section 7 interlocutory
appeal. Walsh declined to take the appeal. In Fernandez, unlike in
North, the Attorney General and the Independent Counsel could
not reconcile their differences.
92 After judge Gesell said that CIPA required the Attorney General personally "to take
ultimate responsibility for dismissal of charges caused by the withholding of classified ma-
terial," Attorney Thornburgh submitted an affidavit stating that "he would have moved to
block the disclosure of certain classified information had independent counsel Lawrence E.
Walsh continued to press for the use of the documents at trial." Two Iran-Contra Charges
Against North Dismissed, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Jan. 14, 1989, at 99. By submitting this affidavit
the Attorney General demonstrated his willingness to assume responsibility for the dismissal
of charges on classified information grounds.
91
 ill S. Ct. 2235 (1991). On appeal, North's conviction for falsifying and destroying
official documents (under 18 U.S.C. § 2017(b)) was originally overturned outright while the
other two convictions were vacated and remanded. Later, however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia amended its holding and reinstated the overturned
conviction, remanding it with the other two. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991). On September 16, 1991, after the trial court
commenced proceedings on remand regarding the impact of North's immunized testimony
on the prosecution's witnesses, Independent Counsel Walsh moved to dismiss the remaining
counts against North. Walsh believed that he could not meet his burden of proving that the
witnesses had not been influenced by North's immunized testimony. Therefore, he concluded
that a dismissal was appropriate.
c"4 Fernandez was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (two counts) and 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (1088) (two counts).
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Walsh suggested to the Department of Justice that it must file
a section 6(e) affidavit to block disclosure of the classified infor-
mation at issue or risk the consequences. The Department of Justice
considered the filing of a section 6(e) affidavit to be premature and
instead "urged" Independent Counsel Walsh to file an interlocutory
appea1.95 Independent Counsel Walsh did not request a section 6(e)
affidavit from the Attorney General, nor did he attempt to file an
interlocutory appeal. Instead, a trial attorney for the Independent
Counsel advised the court that the Office of the Independent Coun-
sel was prepared to proceed to trial. This statement was made
despite the fact that the trial judge's rulings would have permitted
the disclosure of classified information." By choosing to delay any
CIPA section 7 appeal until after the Attorney General filed a
section 6(e) affidavit and the court imposed sanctions, 97 Walsh ap-
peared to leave the Department of Justice with no choice but to file
the section 6(e) affidavit. 98 As in North, the Department of Justice
instead sought a stay on the morning of trial and filed an appeal
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The circuit court, like the district court in North, held that the
Attorney General had no standing to appeal because under CIPA
section 7 such power is a "prosecutorial function," and therefore
belongs to the Independent Counsel under section 594(a) of the IC
Statute." Regarding national security concerns, the court was sat-
isfied that the Attorney General could discharge his duty to protect
national security by filing a CIPA section 6(e) affidavit.'" The court
agreed with Independent Counsel Walsh that he could wait for the
95
 United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1989).
96 The Independent Counsel's decision not to request a § 6(e) affidavit and not to file
an interlocutory appeal demonstrates that when an Independent Counsel and the Attorney
General disagree about the manner in which classified information ought to be protected,
national security may be jeopardized.
97 Id.
" See Letter from Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Law-
rence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel 2 ( July 20, 1989) (on file with the author) (discussing
the position of the Department of Justice with respect to United States v. Fernandez).
" Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 468. The Fernandez court found persuasive the fact that the IC
Statute, in 28 U.S.C. § 594(a), declares that the Independent Counsel's powers are not to be
limited by "any other provision of law." The court concluded that the legislative history of
the IC Statute showed that the requirement of obtaining the Attorney General's authorization
for wiretaps in 594(a) is the "one and only" exception in the IC Statute to the Independent
Counsel's "total independence." Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 468 (citing S. REP. No. 170, 95th
Cong., 2c1 Sess. 67 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4283)). For some reason,
Independent Counsel Walsh never sought to litigate the question of whether the IC Statute
transferred the Attorney General's II 6(e) CIPA power to the Independent Counsel.
140
 Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 470-71.
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Attorney General to file the section 6(e) affidavit, and then appeal
any sanctions imposed by the court "when, if ever, he wants."I°'
C. Division of CIPA Responsibilities Between the Independent Counsel
and the Attorney General
North and Fernandez demonstrate that the conflict of interest
within the Executive Branch, which the IC Statute was designed to
eliminate, still exists when the IC Statute and CIPA operate in the
same case. 1 °2 In a pure CIPA case not involving an Independent
Counsel, the Attorney General controls all decisions concerning
classified information. As noted, CIPA provides two ways in which
the Attorney General can control the release of classified informa-
tion. First, under section 7 the Attorney General can appeal adverse
court rulings on the proposed substitution of admissions and sum-
maries for classified information offered by the government. Sec-
ond, under section 6(e) the Attorney General may file an affidavit
preventing the use of the classified information at trial. The conflu-
ence of these powers in the office of Attorney General permits the
Executive Branch to resolve all issues concerning classified infor-
mation "in house."
Similarly, in a pure IC Statute case the Independent Counsel
exercises full prosecutorial authority and discretion in behalf of the
United States. Because all of the powers of the Attorney General,
save the power to authorize wiretaps, are transferred to the Inde-
pendent Counsel, she effectively stands in the shoes of the Attorney
General. Moreover, because the entire Executive Branch, including
the President, is removed from the prosecutorial process when an
Independent Counsel is appointed, the Independent Counsel is
essentially the CEO for the Executive Branch. She can also resolve,
" 1 Id. at 470.
'° In Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia anticipated some of the problems that might
arise because the same people who are covered by the Ethics in Government Act, and who
must be prosecuted by an Independent Counsel, would be intimately involved with large
amounts of classified information. 487 U.S. 654,707-08 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Com-
menting on the ambiguity of the statutory requirement that the Independent Counsel comply
with Department of Justice policy "except where not possible," Justice Scalia noted:
Mite would be hard put to come up with many investigative or prosecutorial
'policies' . . that are absolute. Almost all investigative and prosecutorial deci•
sions . involve the balancing of innumerable legal and practical considerations
. . . [Al preeminently political decision is whether getting a conviction in a
particular case is worth the disclosure of national security information that
would be necessary.
Id.
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in house, all issues and conflicts concerning the prosecution of the
case.'°3
Specifically, the Independent Counsel possesses de jure prose-
cutorial powers, such as the power to indict, the power to try the
case, the exclusive power to appeal adverse rulings under section
7, and the power to dismiss charges on behalf of the United States.
The Attorney General retains the power to file a section 6(e) affi-
davit. Although this is the Attorney General's only formal power, it
provides a potentially powerful veto of a criminal case. The Attor-
ney General can cause counts of the indictment to be dismissed, or
even prevent the trial, by threatening to file or by actually filing a
section 6(e) affidavit. In a combined CIPA-IC Statute case, the
Independent Counsel has no authority to challenge the Attorney
General's filing of a section 6(e) affidavit. Similarly, the Attorney
General can challenge neither the Independent Counsel's failure to
make motions or objections, nor her refusal to take appeals that the
Attorney General regards as necessary to protect national security.
From the Attorney General's perspective, it will ordinarily be
in the best interest of the Executive Branch to appeal all adverse
CIPA rulings prior to filing a section 6(e) affidavit in a CIPA-IC
Statute case.'" An appeal offers the opportunity to reverse lower
court rulings unfavorable to the government's position on CIPA
issues and thereby avoid the need for the Attorney General to file
I" The IC Statute was not designed to eliminate all kinds of "conflict of interest" that
may affect prosecutors. Nor was it designed to eliminate choices between competing prose-
cutorial interests, such as the choice between the benefits of proceeding promptly to trial
and of bettering the prosecution's posture at trial by winning an interlocutory appeal from
trial court rulings that restrict the prosecution's presentation of evidence, or expand that of
the defendant. Further, the IC Statute is not intended to avoid disagreements among the
government counsel about how these choices should be made or eliminate the "conflict"
between the desirability of securing a conviction and the desirability of protecting national
security.
The IC Statute was designed only to eliminate a particular kind of "conflict of interest":
the conflict between the Department of Justice's interest in prosecuting federal crimes and
its interest in protecting certain high-ranking members of the Executive Branch, and other
"favorites" of the Administration. One of the problems presented in a CIPA-IC Statute case
is the very kind of conflict of interest that the IC Statute was designed to eliminate. The
problem is that the Attorney General can use his unilateral power to file a CIPA 6(e)
affidavit as'a device for aborting the prosecution of a politically favored defendant, and thus
protect the Administration's "friends."
One might expect the Independent Counsel, as much as the Attorney General, to
dislike the prospect that a CIPA § 6(e) affidavit may result in dismissal of charges, or other
sanctions that make the prosecution less likely to succeed. The Attorney General, however,
has the additional concern that the public may perceive a filing of a .1 6(e) affidavit as
politically motivated—to protect high-ranking members of the Executive Branch from crim-
inal prosecution.
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a section 6(e) affidavit. But from the Independent Counsel's per-
spective, it may not always be in the best interest of the prosecution
to appeal all adverse lower court rulings. Appeals cause delays that
can jeopardize the prosecution.'°5 Thus, the positions taken by the
Attorney General and the Independent Counsel may often conflict
in a CIPA-IC Statute case.
III. MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLICY RESOLUTION OF THE CIPA-IC
STATUTE DILEMMA
The previous sections have demonstrated the strain that the
simultaneous operation of the IC Statute and CIPA places on each
statute's goals. North and Fernandez illustrate how the different per-
spectives of the Attorney General and the Independent Counsel
are likely to produce disagreements about the desirability of pro-
tecting classified information. Thus, in moving toward a policy res-
olution of the dilemma presented by a CIPA-IC Statute case, we
must first highlight the competing interests of the Independent
_Counsel and the Attorney General created by the interaction of
these statutes.
A. Competing Interests of the Independent Counsel and the Attorney
General
An Independent Counsel is appointed solely to investigate and,
if appropriate, prosecute a person or persons covered by the IC
Statute. In determining whether or not to prosecute, an Indepen-
dent Counsel is not encumbered by the same concerns that would
hamper the Executive Branch. If the Department of Justice were
handling the case, it could face budgetary constraints such as the
appropriate allocation of resources among its many cases. Unlike
ordinary government prosecutors, the Independent Counsel's office
105 Delays are problematic in any prosecution. They are especially problematic in an IC
Statute case because of the high-profile nature of the case. Moreover, as stated earlier, an
Independent Counsel is a private attorney. Many of the Independent Counsel's senior staff
attorneys, such as John Keker, the lead prosecutor in the North case, have law practices that
they cannot pursue while serving in the office of the Independent Counsel. The protracted
nature of the appeals process could create severe hardships for them. Many of these attorneys
could be forced to leave public service and return to their private practices. Moreover, in a
case like North, where the Independent Counsel took significant steps to ensure that his trial
team be kept separate from the immunized testimony of Oliver North, a change in the trial
team could have significant negative consequences for successful prosecution of the case.
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has an unlimited budget,'° 5
 enabling her to devote whatever re-
sources are necessary to the prosecution of her case. In addition to
an unlimited budget, the high-profile nature of an Independent
Counsel prosecution could mean unlimited scrutiny and criticism.
In the Iran-Contra prosecutions, 107
 Independent Counsel
Walsh persevered despite a great deal of criticism from the trial
judge,'°8 the media'°9 and even the minority leadership of the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives."° The intensity of the criti-
1 °6
 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(2) (1988), guarantees the
Independent Counsel an unlimited budget. "The Department of Justice shall pay all costs
relating to the establishment and operation of any office of independent counsel." Id. To
date, Independent Counsel Walsh has spent over $25 million in investigations and prosecu-
tions relating to the Iran-Contra affair. See Very Special Prosecutors . , WASH. TIMES, June
5, 1991, at G2. In light of the unlimited budget and the public pressure associated with such
a high-profile case that requires the appointment of an independent counsel, one can un-
derstand why there is such pressure to prosecute. Obviously, the greater the publicity asso-
ciated with a particular investigation and the greater the public perception that a crime has
been committed, the greater the pressure to prosecute.
107
 As of September 13, 1991, Independent Counsel Walsh gave no signal that his
investigation was concluding. Indeed, on July 21 of the same year, Alan D. Fiers, a former
Chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force, pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts
of lying to Congress. Fiers's guilty plea has enabled Independent Counsel Walsh to renew
"interest in two men whose involvement in the [Iran-Contra] scandal had been thought laid
to rest ... according to sources close to the investigation." Stephanie Saul, The Ghost of
Investigations Past, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1991, at 17. To that end, on September 6, 1991, former
CIA Operations Chief Clair E. George, was indicted "on 10 counts of perjury, making false
statements and obstructing Congressional investigations in connection with testimony he gave
on the Iran-Contra affair to three Congressional committees and a Federal grand jury."
Michael Wines, Ex-C.I.A. Official Denies 10 Charges, N.Y. Times, September 13, 1991, at A17.
108
 District Judge Gesell informed Walsh that he "would bear a very heavy burden" and
that "[Ws a pretty big can of worms" to overcome the Kastigar problems raised by Oliver
North. Robert L. Jackson, North Conviction in Doubt, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1991,
at A 19. Kastigar problems involve the tainting of a witness's testimony when the witness has
been exposed to immunized testimony.
109
 An editorial in the Washington Times characterized Walsh's decision to continue this
way:
The Reagan administration is history, the Ayatollah Khomeini is dead and the
Contras have been disbanded, but none of these transitions has stayed the
sleepless march of Lawrence Walsh, special prosecutor, grand inquisitor and
antiquarian-in-chief of the late unpleasantness known as the Iran-Contra scan-
dal. Appointed in December, 1986 to ferret out wrongdoing and its doers in
the executive branch, Mr. Walsh and his team of lawyers, investigators, spokes-
persons and minions have brought the hammer of justice down on the heads
of eight whole people, all of two of whom have actually received prison sen-
tences. After two years and six months, his operation has cost $25.2 million by
his own estimate, and still it festers.
Very Special Prosecutors ... , supra note 106, at G2.
II° Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and a group of House Republicans led
by Minority Leader Robert H. Mitchell of Illinois asked Attorney General Thornburgh to
dismiss Independent Counsel Walsh. Walsh Vows Quick End to Iran-Contra Inquiry, L.A. TIMES,
June I, 1991, at A20.
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cism leveled against Independent Counsel Walsh shows that the
Independent Counsel's autonomy is neither academic nor fragile.
An Independent Counsel possesses the resources, and may feel the
obligation, to pursue a controversial investigation despite resistance
and objections that many professional prosecutors would find
daunting."'
In the area of national security, however, the mission of the
Attorney General is arguably just as sacred. The Attorney General
is largely concerned with safeguarding national security, either by
prosecuting those who endanger it or by discharging his CIPA
duties. In cases that do not involve the interaction of CIPA and the
IC Statute, the Attorney General often must decide between the
public disclosure of classified information and the dismissal of
charges against a defendant.
The Independent Counsel's and Attorney General's interests
may compete as they did in North and Fernandez. The Independent
Counsel is appointed to worry more about a successful prosecution
than about preventing the disclosure of classified information that
may compromise national security. The Independent Counsel, un-
like the Attorney General, is not part of the Cabinet. This ensures
insulation from political bias, but on the other hand, it may mean
narrowness of goals and vision. Finally, the factual information that
guides the Attorney General's and the Independent Counsel's re-
spective analyses is likely to be different because their investigative
resources and access to relevant information are often unequal. The
Independent Counsel may not have access to information that
would .show how serious a threat to national security the public
disclosure of certain classified information could pose while the
Attorney General and other cabinet members would. Moreover, the
Independent Counsel will ordinarily not be privy to the Executive
Branch's foreign policy goals, which may affect the seriousness of
a classification.
The Attorney General on the other hand might be overly con-
cerned about the potential threat to national security presented by
a CIPA case. This might be the result of the intelligence agencies'
tendency to over-classify and the deference that the Attorney Gen-
eral might pay to the experts in the intelligence agencies. In a CIPA-
"' See generally RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBORG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE (1982), where the authors assert that "prosecutors appointed specially for one
or a series of related cases may exhibit messianic impulses rarely found among careerists."
Id. at 104.
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IC Statute case, the Executive's loss of exclusive control over these
prosecutions might cause it to be more conservative in the positions
that it takes relating to classified information. Once it decides that
information can be publicly disclosed, the Independent Counsel
alone makes the determination on the part of the Executive Branch
whether the prosecution ought to continue.
Because the Attorney General and the Independent Counsel
ultimately do not have entirely the same goals, some conflict con-
cerning the use of classified information is inevitable. Indeed, even
if the interests of the Independent Counsel and Attorney General
completely coincided—if, for instance, both were concerned with
balancing national security interests against prosecutorial benefits—
it would still be very likely that the Independent Counsel and the
Attorney General would disagree in many classified information/
national security cases. Disagreements are inevitable, if only because
balancing the competing considerations in these complex cases is
an imprecise science. More than one reasonable analysis or balance
is almost always possible, and any two reasonable lawyers are bound
to disagree about the judgments that have to made in difficult cases.
B. The Goals of CIPA and the IC Statute
In addition to recognizing the unavoidable conflicts between
the Independent Counsel and the Attorney General, we should, in
attempting to resolve the dilemma caused by a CIPA-IC Statute
case, also consider the harms that the IC Statute and CIPA were
designed to avoid. This is necessary to determine whether there is
a solution that will maximize the goals of each statute while mini-
mizing the harms caused by the conflict. Thus, the following dis-
cussion will examine the principle goals of these statutes in the
context of a CIPA-IC Statute case.
1. The Public Confidence Problem 12
The principal goal of the IC Statute is to ensure that high-
ranking government officials do not receive special treatment in the
I " The concept of public confidence is intended to be restricted to the general public's
trust, or lack thereof, in the prosecutorial decisions of the government. Predicting the effect
that different procedures are likely to have on public confidence is a matter of guesswork.
A lack of public confidence is a serious problem, because as long as citizens trust the U.S.
government and its system of justice, they will allow the rule of law to determine the outcome
of disputes with the government. Even this assumption, however, is subject to challenge. For
example, one could argue that a lack of public confidence in the government serves to keep
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investigation and prosecution of their cases."' The conflict created
by a CIPA-IC Statute case has demonstrated, however, that even if
an Independent Counsel prosecutes high-ranking members of the
Executive Branch, public confidence that these prosecutions will be
immune from the influence of the Department of Justice may still
be undermined. For example, the dismissal of certain charges
against North was criticized by Representative Jack Brooks of Texas
"'as a backdoor way' to give North a pardon."'" The People for the
American Way, a civil liberties group, likewise viewed the dismissal
of two counts against North prior to trial as a 'pocket pardon.'"" 5
Similarly, in an editorial concerning the dropping of the charges,
one person wrote that "we are skeptical about the manner in which
that judgment is being made because the people making it—top
Reagan administration officials—stand to lose the most from any
revelations."" 6 Reaction to the dismissal of the two counts against
North highlights the public cynicism about the likelihood of high-
ranking members of the Executive Branch being treated without
favoritism.
Certain segments of the public were equally suspicious of the
Executive Branch when it interrupted the Fernandez trial. The mo-
tivations of the Attorney General were / questioned; his actions were
again considered a way to protect Joseph Fernandez—an individual
closely linked to the Administration—from prosecution. Indeed,
when the Attorney General filed, for the first time ever, a section
6(e) affidavit, the public's greatest suspicions and fears were real-
ized. In an editorial in the New York Times, one commentator wrote:
We have taken a step toward arbitrary, unaccountable
government power. That is the significance of the stym-
the government honest and to keep government from evolving tyrannical powers. Further,
the continued existence of moderate levels of public distrust of government serves to avert
episodic surges of more acute distrust, which tend to be more distinctly destabilizing.
113 See supra note 2.
"' Glen Craney, Iran-Contra Case May Drop Two Counts, Colic. Q. Wan,. REP., Jan. 7,
1989, at 28.
115 Ronald J. Ostrow & Robert L. Jackson, Walsh Seeks to Drop 2 Key North Charges, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1989, at Al.
16 In North Case, Secrecy Is Winning Out Over justice, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 1989, at 3. Indeed,
when the Department of justice interrupted the North trial over the objections of the Inde-
pendent Counsel, one reporter wrote that, "[tihe Justice Department's slyly timed effort to
jam the 'controls just as the Oliver North trial enters its painstakingly prepared takeoff roll
is aimed at saving George Bush the political embarrassment he deserved, but mostly escaped,
in the Iran-Contra scandal." Randolph Ryan, Saving Bush at North's Expense, BOSTON GLOEE,
Feb. 10, 1989, at 11.
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ieing of efforts to prosecute . . . Joseph Fernandez ... .
If the Fernandez case stands up, then, it means that gov-
ernment officials who operate in secret can commit crimes
without fear of punishment. For they can count on the
guardians of secrecy to prevent a prosecution." 7
In general, these newspaper articles and editorials demonstrate that
a certain segment of the public neither understands nor trusts the
role of the Executive Branch in a CIPA-IC Statute case. "8
Simply stated, on those occasions when the Independent Coun-
sel and the Attorney General agree that charges cannot be brought
without compromising national security, the public may view the
Independent Counsel as nothing more than a puppet of the Exec-
utive Branch. Although it is hard to think of a dismissal of charges
on grounds of national security as a "technicality," the invocation
of this ground for abandoning a prosecution, especially one against
those in positions of power, certainly contributes to the erosion of
public confidence in prosecutorial decisions, our criminal justice
system and government in general. This is because the public may
not know that the problem of compromising national security is a
real one, and may believe that it is just something invented by
bureaucrats to allow them to cloak their activities. Further, the
public may not trust the Attorney General or the President to permit
the prosecution of a political colleague or friend. These issues high-
light the complex nature of maintaining public confidence in the
handling and outcome of a CIPA-IC Statute case.
The public is naturally suspicious when any action by the Ex-
ecutive Branch leads to the dismissal of charges against high-rank-
ing government officials, even when that action is endorsed by the
Independent Counsel" 19 This suspicion is likely to be compounded
when the Attorney General and Independent Counsel disagree
about national security. The IC Statute's 1982 amendments recog-
nized the importance of this problem: "when conflicts [between the
'" Anthony Lewis, Government of Laws?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1989, at A31.
"8 It is possible that this merely demonstrates that political use can be, and often will
be, made of anything that can be presented as an attack against a differing political philos-
ophy. It is worth noting, on the other hand, the extent to which the public's suspicion is
informed by what it sees reported by the press. See Craney, supra note 17, at 273. This serves
as a further basis for public suspicion of the Executive Branch in a CIPA-IC Statute case.
" 4 This is a problem that could be eliminated or reduced simply by better coordination
between the Independent Counsel and Attorney General before charges are filed, so that
the Independent Counsel knows before drafting the charging document that the Attorney
General will oppose disclosure of information needed to support certain charges. Therefore,
the Indepedent Counsel can consider not bringing the charges in the first place.
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Executive Branch and the Independent Counsel] exist, or when the
public believes there are conflicts, public confidence in prosecutorial
decisions is eroded, if not totally lost." 2°
In the situation where a CIPA case is being prosecuted by an
Independent Counsel, attempts by the Executive Branch to protect
classified information are viewed as impediments to the prosecution
of members of its own branch of government.' 2 ' Where such de
facto immunity is actually enjoyed, it undercuts the criminal law as
a deterrent to corruption in high levels of government.' 22 The
potential dangers of a withdrawal of criminal sanctions would be
extraordinarily magnified with respect to those persons dealing with
critical national security matters, such as North and Fernandez.
2. The National Security Problem ' 23
The principal goal of CIPA is to protect national security by
preventing defendants from releasing or threatening to release clas-
120 S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3537, 3540.
121 One newspaper reported the conflict in Fernandez by declaring that "It]he case against
(Fernandez] was dismissed . . . because the Justice Department blocked the use of classified
documents he said he needed for his defense." Iran-Contra Figures and Their Status, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, § 1, at 24.
122 S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294,
4297. Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann stated:
Indeed, decisions not to prosecute high level officials in the interest of protecting
classified information have implications beyond the failure to redress particular
instances of illegal conduct. Such determinations foster the perception that
government officials and private persons with access to military or technological
secrets have a broad de facto immunity from prosecution for a variety of crimes.
This perception not only undermines the public's confidence in the fair admin-
istration of criminal justice but it also promotes concern that there is no effective
check against improper conduct by members of our intelligence agencies.
Id.
123 "'The distinctive meaning of national security is freedom from foreign dictation.'" MOORE
ET AL., supra note 55, at 3 (quoting H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 51 (1971)). Nevertheless, the problem of defining national security:
is a matter of clarifying perceptions of what is to be made secure from whom
and how? What is at stake? How is it threatened? How should it be protected?
The answers to these questions are resolved—deliberately or by default—
through the political process and are frequently embodied—with varying de-
grees of clarity and consistency—in law . . . . National security is a highly
charged political symbol with variable, ambiguous, and frequently contentious
content.
Id.
The imprecise nature of national security makes possible a number of alternative ways
of defining it. One could argue that the national security of the United States would be
damaged seriously if citizens came to an erroneous belief that national leaders are warmon-
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sified information ' 24 in the course of their defense, thereby forcing
the government to drop the prosecution.' 25 Yet disagreements be-
tween the Independent Counsel and Attorney General in a CIPA-
IC Statute case could jeopardize national security and thereby frus-
trate the purpose of CIPA. Almost invariably, CIPA-IC Statute cases
are high-visibility cases, attended by public interest and media scru-
tiny. Many of them may produce jury trials. Under these circum-
stances, even the most sober and conscientious Independent Coun-
sel is likely to feel that she must protect her public image, both to
avoid a climate of skepticism within the pool of prospective jurors
and to protect her long-range professional standing.
When checked by the Attorney General's filing of a CIPA sec-
tion 6(e) affidavit, the Independent Counsel has no effective way
to protect her public image except to publicly criticize, directly or
indirectly,r26 the Attorney General's decision to take such action.
gers looking for any reason to bomb foreign nations. See infra notes 136-39. President Reagan
arguably could have caused that kind of damage by non-disclosure of his reasons for bombing
Libya following the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque. Even more essentially,
the national security of a democracy is damaged if its President cannot explain to its people
why he has bombed an apparently innocent foreign nation. Thus, if President Reagan had
said nothing, the United States possibly would have precious little national security left. This
article concerns national security in a more classic sense, where it may be jeopardized by the
untimely release of classified information. This is possible when the Attorney General in a
CIPA-IC Statute case must decide whether to file a CIPA 6(e) affidavit to prevent the
disclosure of classified information without the benefit of a neutral party to evaluate and, if
appropriate, endorse the filing as proper.
124
 This article assumes that the classified information at issue is properly classified.
Similarly, it assumes that the Executive Branch is not abusing its power to classify information.
If the Executive Branch is abusing these powers, the Independent Counsel should be free
to challenge the classification practices in court. In the Iran-Contra cases, however, Indepen-
dent Counsel Walsh never made any such challenge. It was his position that although the
information might be properly classified, its public disclosure would not threaten national
security. For a perspective that is highly critical of the government's classification system, and
that suggests courts adopt a less deferential standard, see Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the
Courts and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1990).
125 See supra note 4.
125 Independent Counsel Walsh complained that the government was covering up a
"fictional secret" because much of the classified information in dispute had already been
reported in the press. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel, to Edward
S.G. Dennis, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General 2 ( July 21, 1989) (on file with the author)
(discussing the position of the Office of Independent Counsel with respect to United Stales v.
Fernandez). Walsh's statement was reported in the media shortly thereafter. See, e.g., David
Johnston, Prosecution of Ex-CIA Agent in Iran-Contra Case: A Slow Dance Around the Issue of
Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989, at A14. Theoretically, if an Independent Counsel was
wrong, the release of the classified information in dispute could jeopardize national security
in several ways. It could damage our foreign relations with the countries involved, lead to
the overthrow of governments secretly working with the United States, or endanger under-
cover U.S. agents connected with the reported activity.
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Although she could ask the CIA, the State Department, or the
President for support, the Attorney General may have consulted
these executive officials before filing the affidavit, and the Indepen-
dent Counsel can realistically expect that these officials will more
often back the Attorney General than the Independent Counsel.
Moreover, since there is no apparently neutral arbitrator between
the independent Counsel and the Executive Branch, when the
Independent Counsel does speak out, the public and the media are
likely to believe that the Independent Counsel's case has merit.
There is no one who can credibly dispute the Independent Coun-
sel's claims without revealing the classified information in question.
This belief or suspicion will predictably encourage the media
to investigate the facts surrounding the dispute, keep the subject
alive in the public eye, and attempt to find information to "expose"
the situation. The more intense and protracted the media coverage
and investigation, the more likely it is that something will eventually
come out that directly reveals or indirectly compromises classified
information.' 27 Media scrutiny may also invest questionable infor-
mation with whatever degree of credibility a foreign government
may demand before acting on such information.' 28
11 ' Exactly what information must be classified is very complex. It may include the
identity of witnesses, the location of people and the very methods used to obtain classified
information. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
1 " The Attorney General and the Executive might permit the public disclosure of
classified information, despite its genuine belief that such disclosure would threaten national
security. An example of the effect of public pressure on the Executive's decision to permit
the disclosure of classified information occurred in the case of the April 14, 1986 bombing
of Libya by the United States. Intense public pressure forced President Reagan to disclose
publicly the classified information that led to the U.S. bombardment of Libya.
In a television address, President Reagan confirmed the fact that the United States had
intercepted and decoded a number of messages that indicated that a Libyan-sponsored
terrorist organization perpetrated the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin in which American
servicemen were killed. President Reagan disclosed this information in order to justify the
bombing of Libya. In reference to this disclosure, George Carver, a former Deputy Director
of the CIA, "complained that President Reagan 'was so detailed that it may be a very long
time before we get anything like that comparable quality, and as a result, Americans might
die.— U.S. Lucked Out on Disco Bomb Data, Experts Say, CHI, TRIB., Apr. 17, 1986, at 2. Another
newspaper noted that:
[Intelligence] officials said the information divulged by Mr. Reagan and others
about intercepted Libyan messages had raised problems for intelligence agencies
because Libya was now likely to alter its communication methods. The officials
said this was a calculated risk, taken so that Mr. Reagan could make as convincing
a case as possible in justifying the raid on Libya.
U.S. Aides Provide Details on Paris Plot Tied to Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A18.
Ultimately, the damage done was summed up this way:
Intelligence could have appropriately been used in Libya for two objectives.
One would have been to overthrow Qacidafi and to replace him with a more
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If a neutral arbiter, such as an Independent Special Arbiter
("ISA"), were available, the Independent Counsel would be less
likely to go to the public in the first place. It would be foolhardy
for the Independent Counsel to go to the public before or instead of
going to the ISA. And after the ISA has rejected the Independent
Counsel's position, the Independent Counsel would be less prone
to go to the public because she would likely feel less convinced of
either the rightness or the acceptability of her position. If the In-
dependent Counsel does go to the public after her position has been
rejected by an ISA, the Independent Counsel's position would be
both less credible and more easily rebutted without disclosing clas-
sified information; the ISA can state publicly that the Independent
Counsel's claim was considered and rejected by the ISA.
Clearly, many reasonable people may believe that the harms of
disclosing classified information are exaggerated. In fact, some of
these claims are probably exaggerated. The exaggeration of some
claims, however, does not discredit them all. It would be as unrea-
sonable to underestimate as to overstate the harms, and the exis-
tence of some very serious risks of harm have been soundly docu-
mented.'"
Indeed, the disclosure of intercepted Libyan messages follow-
ing the United States' bombing of Libya alerted the United States'
reasonable Government. There is some evidence that this was tried. The other
objective would have been to use our vast resources for collecting intelligence
to provide forewarning of terrorist attacks. We had such forewarning, a little
too late, in the case of the Berlin nightclub.
But instead of exploiting our collection capabilities, the administration
seriously weakened, if it did not destroy, them when it revealed how good they
were. Officials probably thought that they had to do this to establish the cred-
ibility of their charge of Libyan sponsorship. But when they said that we were
reading Libyan diplomatic messages, they as much told the Libyans to get new
codes that we cannot read.
Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6, at 17, 19.
This may or may not have been a worthwhile price to pay for giving the American
people and the world some assurance that the United States was acting responsibly. The
release of the information was a political decision that President Reagan made and was
required to defend. Its relevance to this article is to demonstrate how pressure by the media
and public can be so great as to require the Administration to disclose classified information,
even at the risk of jeopardizing national security by "alert[ing] the Libyans to the fact that
American intelligence had been reading their messages." Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Aides Call
Libyan Plats Undeterred by Raid, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1986, at A8. The creation of an ISA will
help to ensure that a decision to disclose in a CI PA-IC Statute case is not made simply because
there is no independent arbiter who can hear the Executive's reasons why disclosure ought
not to be permitted. See infra section IV.
'" See supra note 128.
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enemies to our intelligence capabilities. In disclosing these capabil-
ities, President Reagan severely damaged a valuable source of in-
telligence, presumably because he believed that it was in the best
interests of the country to do so. If the Executive Branch is willing
to disclose national security secrets to justify its actions, then there
is reason to be concerned that such disclosure could occur in crim-
inal prosecutions of high-ranking members of the Executive
Branch. Although disclosure of classified information may not be
in the country's best interests, the public outcry in such prosecutions
can be very persuasive. In a criminal prosecution handled by an
Independent Counsel, the principal reason why the Executive
Branch might be tempted to disclose classified information, despite
the belief that disclosure is inimical to the interests of national
security, would be to eliminate the public suspicion that arises when-
ever the Executive Branch interrupts the prosecution of its high-
ranking members. In a situation where the Attorney General is
forced to file a CEPA section 6(e) affidavit, the public will likely see
such a move as a "cover up" simply on the basis of the filing. Thus,
if the public outcry is great enough, the Executive Branch might
be tempted to release the information and allow the prosecution to
continue, even if it would harm national security.
C. Potential Solutions to CIPA-IC Statute Conflict
The following procedures have been suggested to help resolve
the dilemma caused by a CIPA-IC Statute case, but are not used in
current practice. The statutes, properly construed, do not require
the adoption of these procedures. This section will show that these
procedures would be strongly undesirable as a matter of policy
because they fail to maximize the objectives of either CIPA or the
IC Statute.'"
1. Assumption by the Independent Counsel of the Attorney
General's CIPA Section 6(e) Powers
Transferring all of the Attorney General's CIPA powers to the
Independent Counsel would solve problems created by the present
distribution of CIPA power between the Attorney General and the
Independent Counsel."' There are several reasons, however, why
• 13° This article will not discuss whether CIPA and the IC Statute as presently construed
would allow the adoption of these procedures.
131 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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the Independent Counsel ought not to be given the Attorney Gen-
eral's CIPA section 6(e) power. As stated earlier, the Independent
Counsel is likely to be particularly interested in vigorously prose-
cuting the case' 32 and less concerned with protecting national se-
curity. Moreover, the Independent Counsel's appointment is based
on her qualifications as a lawyer, not on her expertise or responsi-
bility in national security or foreign relations.'"
Generally, the Executive Branch is charged with safeguarding
the most sensitive information relating to national security and
foreign relations. The performance of this responsibility is a delicate
task. The authors of a text on national security described the rele-
vant institutional pressures of the Executive Branch as follows:
Indeed, it is the very intensity of individual beliefs about
national security—their deep seated, emotional, even vis-
ceral quality—that places such a burden on institutions of
political decision-making and legal process. Because the
balance of values at stake is not always clear, and because
in the heat of crisis the pressure for action increases,
institutional safeguards and procedures assume special
importance in such situations. Without such safeguards,
priorities of single individuals and nonrepresentative
groups—however patriotic and well-meaning they may
be—replace the outcomes derived through accepted ex-
ercise of authority and ultimately undercut broad popular
support for the policies adopted. Such results, in turn,
undermine national security itself.'"
The Independent Counsel, being a unique, temporary official, is
not subject to the same institutional pressures and safeguards as the
Executive Branch.
The absence of institutional safeguards is just one of the rea-
sons why the Independent Counsel should not be charged with
152 See supra section 111.A.
155 See 28 U.S.C. 593(b)(2) (setting forth the qualifications of an Independent Counsel).
Section 593(b)(2) states in part that "Whe division of the court shall appoint as independent
counsel an individual who has appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation
and any prosecution in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner." Id. (emphasis
added). On the other hand, the Attorney General, although not appointed specifically for
expertise in national security or foreign affairs, is evaluated by the President for her ability
to safeguard classified information. In addition, the Attorney General, unlike the Indepen-
dent Counsel, has no institutional barrier preventing her from working closely with experts
in the fields of national security and foreign affairs, such as the CIA and State Department,
without raising concerns about compromising her independence.
134 MOORE ET AL., supra note 55, at 24.
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single-handedly safeguarding classified information that could af-
fect national security. The Independent Counsel is selected by a
Special Division of the court in a secret, unscrutinized fashion, while
election to the Office of the President is the most scrutinized of all
political procedures. Presidents are chosen by the electorate because
they can be trusted to manage important national affairs generally
and foreign affairs specifically.'" By choosing a President, the elec-
torate declares who ought to have ultimate responsibility for making
judgments about national security and foreign relations.
Moreover, the President, unlike the Independent Counsel, is
accountable to voters. If the Attorney General acts improperly, or
is perceived to have acted improperly, the President and perhaps
the President's party will be held politically accountable for the
Attorney General's action or inaction.'" Thus, the political account-
ability of the President for the Attorney General's behavior, as
contrasted with the lack of accountability of an Independent Coun-
sel, supports the view that, from a policy perspective, transferring
all of the Attorney General's CIPA powers to the Independent
Counsel would be unwise. For these reasons, permitting the Inde-
pendent Counsel to assume the CIPA section 6(e) powers of the
Attorney General is no answer to the problems that arise in a CIPA-
1C Statute case.
2. Authorization of the Independent Counsel to Challenge in
Court the Attorney General's Filing of a Section 6(e) Affidavit
Permitting the Independent Counsel to challenge in court the
Attorney General's filing of a section 6(e) affidavit is also not a viable
solution to the problem created by the simultaneous operation of
the IC Statute and CIPA. This power would give the courts au-
thority to decide whether national security would be harmed by the
disclosure of certain classified information. If the court were to
decide that a threat existed, then the trial would be halted by order
of the court, not by order of the Attorney General. This decision
would protect national security, and the public would be less in-
clined to view it with suspicion.
"5 It is worth noting, however, that many Presidential elections occur in contexts where
many other issues and concerns dilute the voters' attention to the capacity of the candidates
to manage foreign affairs capably.
"0 Regarding CIPA 6(e) affidavits, however, the public will seldom have information
available that allows post hoc monitoring of the President's performance. If a 4 6(e) affidavit
is filed, the whole subject is so wrapped in secrecy that it is difficult then for the President
to be fairly held accountable by the electorate.
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If, however, the court were to decide that no threat existed, it
then could reject the Attorney General's section 6(e) affidavit and
order the disclosure of the information during the trial. The pro-
ponents of this procedure are often those who recall President
Richard M. Nixon's attempt to withhold tape recordings and other
documents on the basis of executive privilege.'" These proponents
remember the Supreme Court ordering President Nixon to comply
with the Special Prosecutor's subpoena; Nixon did so and justice
was served. Thus, because the courts have previously prevented
abuses by the Executive, some proponents conclude that the court
ought to act as a watchdog in CIPA-IC Statute cases. But, while the
role of the judiciary in the Nixon case might lend support to having
the courts resolve conflicts between the Independent Counsel and
the Attorney General in CIPA cases, the CIPA-IC Statute conflict
cannot be properly addressed by the courts.
The decision whether to permit the public disclosure of classi-
fied information is a core Executive Branch decision.'" The Su-
preme Court, in C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,'" stressed
the importance of preserving the Executive Branch's authority over
foreign policy, stating that Itjhe President, both as Commander-
in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available
intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be
published to the world."H° Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
that "the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to
Presidential responsibilities"H' regarding the secret military or dip-
lomatic quality of information.' 42 The Court further explained the
142 For example, Professor Sandra D. Jordan cites United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), for the proposition that "an absolute, unqualified executive privilege would conflict
with the Court's function under Article 111." Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent
Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of Justice after Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651,
1677 (1991). Professor Jordan also notes that lapthough the executive branch claim was
presumptively privileged, the court [in Nixon] nevertheless did not accord it utmost deference
since the executive branch claim involved a generalized presidential interest in confidential-
ity." Id. Other proponents of this proposal have suggested it to me orally.
° See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
139 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
140 Id. at Ill.
111 U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
L42 In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953), the Court recognized that even a
court could be prevented from examining classified information: "under circumstances in-
dicating a reasonable possibility that military secrets were involved, there was certainly a
sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the documents . . • ." Id. at 11.
The Reynolds Court also cited with approval Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), for
the proposition that circumstances exist where the "very subject matter of the action, such
as] a contract to perform espionage, [is] a matter of state secret . . . . The action {can be]
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basis for its deference to the Executive on matters involving classi-
fied information by stating that "[i]t would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify
actions of the executive taken on information properly held se-
cret."Hs
Moreover, even if the Court were permitted access to the "se-
cret" information, "the very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial."'" The Court has recognized
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is." 145 Yet it is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the Executive Branch to safeguard national secu-
rity. Indeed, the Court has observed that decisions concerning
national security
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which
the judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsi-
bility and which has long been held to belong in the do-
main of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.' 46
dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence." Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 11.
143 C. & S. Airlines, 333 U.S. at 1 l 1. Professor Sandra D. Jordan believes that the "utmost
deference" standard gives too much deference for the Executive Branch in CIPA-IC Statute
cases. She argues that "when there is a dispute between the executive branch and an inde-
pendent prosecutor, the court should probe deeply and ensure legitimacy of the claimed
privilege." Jordan, supra note 137, at 1680. Moreover, she states that "the Attorney General
should bear the burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of objective evidence that
disclosure of classified information would cause irreparable harm to the United States." Id.
(emphasis added). I believe that Professor Jordan's standard runs afoul of the Constitution
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. There is no more sacred and essential
Executive Branch function than protecting the national security. To require the Executive
Branch to satisfy the Judiciary by a preponderance of objective evidence that public disclosure of
classified information would cause irreparable harm to the national security is too high a
standard. Indeed, imagine if the Executive Branch established that there was a 49% proba-
bility that public disclosure would cause a world war; under Professor Jordan's proposed
standard the classified information would be released. Clearly, the Executive Branch, not the
Judiciary, should decide whether to place the United States in 49% risk of war. Moreover,
disputes about classified information rarely involve "objective evidence"—the only evidence
that Professor Jordan would permit a reviewing court to consider in resolving a CIPA-IC
Statute dispute. See C. & S. Airlines, 333 U.S. at 111.
144 Id.
'4 ' Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
16 C. & S. Airlines, 333 U.S. at 111.
580	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:539
Because courts are less informed, less qualified, and less accountable
than the Executive to make national-security decisions, it would be
unwise as a matter of policy for Congress to amend the present
CIPA-IC Statute scheme to permit the Independent Counsel to
contest in court the Attorney General's filing of a Section 6(e) affi-
davit. Indeed, legislation of this sort might well infringe upon the
constitutional doctrine of separation-of-powers in its "political ques-
tion" form.
3. Authorization of the Attorney General to Challenge Adverse
CIPA Rulings Separately from the Independent Counsel
It could be argued that the Attorney General's interests in
safeguarding national security are sufficiently protected if the At-
torney General has the power to advocate the Department of Jus-
tice's position to a federal judge. There are several procedures that
could provide the Attorney General with such jurisdiction. First,
Congress could allow both the Independent Counsel and the At-
torney General to present their respective, independent positions
on CIPA issues to the district judge, and allow both to take inter-
locutory appeals. Second, it could allow both the Independent
Counsel and the Attorney General to present their respective, in-
dependent positions on CIPA issues to the district judge, but allow
only the Independent Counsel to take interlocutory appeals. Finally,
Congress could allow only the Independent Counsel to present her
positions on CIPA issues to the district judge, but allow both the
Independent Counsel and Attorney General to take interlocutory
appeals. 147
All of these possible solutions give the Attorney General stand-
ing to contest the merits of a judge's ruling on the proposed sub-
stitution of statements of admissions or summaries for classified
information. Giving the Attorney General, as well as the Indepen-
dent Counsel, standing to challenge a trial judge on these CIPA
questions in an IC Statute case would add a layer of protection for
national security. It would give the Attorney General authority to
present and argue CIPA issues to the trial court or appellate court
147
 There are several other possibilities as well. First, the Attorney General could replace
the Independent Counsel as the representative of the United States in the presentation of
CIPA issues, either in the trial court or on an interlocutory appeal. Also, interlocutory appeals
could be abolished entirely. These procedures are inappropriate because an interlocutory
appeal by a representative of the prosecution or the government is desirable (as Congress
decided in enacting § 7 of the present CIPA statute). See supra note 93.
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separately from the Independent Counsel. This would reduce the
likelihood that sensitive issues of national security and foreign re=
lations would escape judicial scrutiny because of the differing re-
sponsibilities and expertise of the Independent Counsel and Attor-
ney General.
Yet there are many problems with giving the Attorney General
standing to resort to trial or appellate courts in connection with
disputed CIPA matters. First, the 1C Statute's primary purpose of
ensuring that prosecutions of high-ranking members of the Exec-
utive Branch are conducted independently—by an entity other than
an agency or division of the Executive Branch—would be frustrated.
Second, the Independent Counsel's decision not to challenge certain
CIPA rulings might be based on a decision that a swift prosecution
of one member of the Executive Branch is critical in order to
preserve the possibility of prosecuting other individuals not yet
facing charges. 148 Third, many of the Independent Counsel's staff
are lawyers who have taken leaves of absence from their primary
employers. A delay could force some or all of these lawyers to resign
and return to their permanent jobs, and therefore lead to an awk-
ward transition in the middle of a case. Fourth, and perhaps most
importantly, if there are counts of the indictment not affected by
the adverse court rulings, the Independent Counsel could decide
that it is better to convict the defendant on those counts as a "sure
thing," rather than extend the proceedings to obtain convictions on
every count. t49
Furthermore, giving the Attorney General standing to litigate
CIPA matters also diminishes the appearance of power and au-
thority that the Independent Counsel might otherwise have, and
undermines her control as the chief prosecutor for the United States
in an IC Statute case.'" Indeed, giving the Attorney General the
149 It is a common practice for prosecutors not to charge all potential defendants at one
time. Prosecutors hope that if they are successful with early prosecutions, these convicted
defendants might be inclined to cooperate by providing information about other individuals.
The longer the early prosecutions take, however, the greater the risk that future charges
may not be brought because of statute of limitations problems.
149 A severance is not a practicable solution. Although the Independent Counsel might
prefer this option because it could give him more than one opportunity to "convict" a
defendant, this solution would be overly burdensome to the defendant. Cases involving
classified information are very costly and time consuming for both the defendant and the
government. The defendant, unlike the Independent Counsel, usually does not have an
unlimited budget.
15D Practically speaking, however, this occurs in every CIPA case under the current
system because the Independent Counsel cannot make the decisions about what classified
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power to appeal would inevitably result in the Attorney General
trumping every decision by the Independent Counsel not to appeal,
because "[i]t is the established policy of the Department [of Justice)
that the filing of the [CIPA] Section 6(e) affidavit is a matter to be
undertaken only in the last resort."'" CIPA's structure recognizes
this and encourages it by providing for interlocutory appeals in
section 7. 152 The Attorney General therefore would likely appeal
every adverse ruling and cause potentially substantial delays.
This solution also does not solve the public perception problem,
because whenever the Attorney General files a section 6(e) affidavit,
the public would still question his motives. In fact, the public would
likely be even more skeptical if the Attorney General exhausted his
judicial options first, and only then filed a section 6(e) affidavit.
When a high-ranking member of the Executive Branch is under
scrutiny, the public may believe that the Attorney General is no
more able to make unbiased decisions about national security than
he is able to make unbiased decisions about prosecution strategy.' 53
Instead of letting the Attorney General appeal adverse CIPA
rulings, Congress could expand the current system. The IC Statute
now provides that the Attorney General may appear in court as
amicus curiae to argue issues that the Department of Justice finds
significant.'" This authority could be broadened to allow the At-
information to release or the contents of substitutions. These are always executive functions,
as the North and Fernandez courts both recognized. See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d
465, 470 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441, 1442 (D.D.C. 1989).
' 51 Letter from Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Lawrence
E. Walsh, Independent Counsel 1 ( July 20, 1989) (on file with the author) (discussing the
position of the Department of Justice with respect to United States v. Fernandez). Thus, if
there are any available alternatives to the filing of a CIPA § 6(e) affidavit, such as taking a
§ 7 interlocutory appeal, Department of Justice policy would favor the alternative.
152 Allowing only the Independent Counsel to present her positions on CIPA issues to
the district judge, but allowing both the Independent Counsel and the Attorney General to
take interlocutory appeals has an additional problem. It forces the Attorney General to
advocate her position in the court of appeals without having presented it in the district court.
Thus, she would not have had the opportunity to make the best record in support of her
position in the district court because the Independent Counsel alone controlled the govern-
ment's submission to the district court on CIPA issues. If the Attorney General is bound by
the record established and the positions asserted by the Independent Counsel in the district
court, the Attorney General's ability to protect her interests will be seriously handicapped.
If the Attorney General is not so bound, inefficient remands will be necessary, and the
question who decides for the government on remand will be extremely complicated. The
alternative to remand—record supplementation procedures on appeal—is obviously ineffi-
cient.
155 See supra section II.C.
154 See 28 U.S.C. § 597(b).
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torney General to file an amicus brief any time he felt his interests
were not being protected. This would not solve the problem, how-
ever, because an appeal must be taken before the Attorney General
can file an amicus brief, and the power to appeal would be in the
hands of the Independent Counsel. Moreover, this, solution once
again would not solve the problem of the public perception of the
Attorney General's motives.
4. Automatic Appeal of All Adverse C1PA Rulings
Another possible method for addressing the public perception
that appeals by the Executive Branch are based on improper mo-
tives is to provide for the automatic appeal of all adverse CIPA
rulings. That is, any time the court rules against the Independent
Counsel on a CIPA issue, the Independent Counsel would be re-
quired to take an immediate appeal of the ruling. This would pro-
tect public confidence by removing the need for the Attorney Gen-
eral to submit a section 6(e) affidavit, at least until all automatic
appeals were exhausted.
This option, however, removes from the Independent Counsel
the discretion to make important prosecutorial decisions, and could
hamper the effective presentation of the case. For example, if the
Independent Counsel has charged a defendant with ten counts of
wrongdoing, one count of which involves classified information, the
Independent Counsel might choose to accept an adverse ruling by
the court on that count because it would have little impact on the
overall case.
In this context, the automatic appeal could cause substantial
delay. This would be particularly true if the case involved the vol-
ume of classified information present in North and Fernandez. In
these cases, automatic appeals could grind the circuit courts' cal-
endars to a halt while they reviewed potentially hundreds of district
court rulings. In addition, it is likely that the Attorney General's
decision to file a section 6(e) affidavit after failure to win the auto-
matic appeal would be greeted by even greater public skepticism,
because two courts would have ruled against earlier efforts by the
government to resist disclosure. Finally, all of the solutions discussed
in this part fail to address the problem of the subversion of the
Independent Counsel's authority.' 55
I" See supra section 11.C.
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5. Judicial Balancing of National Security Interests and the
Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
In United States v. Smith,' 56 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that in a CIPA section 6(a)
hearing the court must balance "the public interest in protecting
the information against the individual's right to prepare his de-
fense."'" In propounding such a balancing test in CIPA section
6(a) hearings, the court realized that lilts application results in a
more strict rule of admissibility," 158 which means the exclusion of
defense evidence. A stricter rule of admissibility allows the prose-
cution both to prosecute and to avoid disclosure. In reality, appli-
cation of a balancing test to determine admissibility results in the
exclusion of most, if not all, of the contested information. The
district court in Smith noted that "[t]he interests of the entire nation,
by definition, always 'substantially outweigh' the interest of a single
individual in a given item of classified information."'"
A solution such as that presented in Smith will most likely lead
to the inability of defendants to introduce the classified information
into evidence. This has the indirect result of vastly reducing the
number of conflicts between the Independent Counsel and the
Attorney General because there will be no adverse rulings concern-
ing the proposed substitution of statements of admissions or sum-
maries for classified information.
Application of the Smith holding is not, however, a practical
solution. The most obvious criticism of this solution is that the
judiciary would be making determinations about whether the na-
tional security interest outweighs the defendant's interest. Under
the separation of powers doctrine, assessment of the potential harm
to national security through the public disclosure of classified in-
formation should be made only by the Executive Branch.'"
' 58 United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
167 Id. at 1105. The Court derived this balancing test from the standard promulgated
in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
166 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105. The Smith court thus analyzed issues concerning classified
information by focusing on defense evidence.
' 39 United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 436 (E.D. Va. 1984).
' 6° A further problem with the Smith decision as a solution is that the Smith holding
affronts Congress's understanding of the procedure it was creating in 6(e) of CIPA. Even
if Congress's understanding were consistent with Smith, however, the problems identified in
this article would remain. See supra section III.B.
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6. Close CIPA Trials to the Public
Professor Sandra D. Jordan has written a thoughtful article on
the conflict between the Executive Branch and the Independent
Counsel in cases involving classified information. 16 ' Professor Jor-
dan asserts that "[t]hree procedures, taken together, may solve the
[public disclosure of classified information or dismissal of
charges]' 62 dilemma: trial closure, a limited (security cleared) jury
pool, and the defendant's prior consent to both of these proce-
dures." 63 In her view, such a proposal would withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny and would be good policy. I, however, find the con-
stitutional difficulty to be greater than Professor Jordan concedes,
and more importantly I believe that her proposal would promote
even greater public distrust in our system of criminal justice than
the public distrust created by the current CIPA-IC Statute conflict.
Part of her proposal to resolve the dilemma would "[restrict]
public access to the trial in some circumstances by . . . closing the
trial or portions thereof altogether." 164 Professor Jordan even sug-
gests that "[t]he trial itself could be conducted, partially or entirely,
in camera." 165 To withstand the public's or press's First Amendment
challenge to her three-part proposal, Professor Jordan relies on
language from three Supreme Court cases: Richmond Newspapers,
Inc, v. Virginia, 166 Waller v. Georgia,' 67 and Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court.'"
161 See Jordan, supra note 137.
162 This is the classic "graymail" problem that occurs whenever defendants threaten to
disclose classified information in order to defend themselves from charges of criminal wrong-
doing. In such situations the government must decide between public disclosure of classified
information or dismissal of charges.
163 See Jordan, supra note 137, at 1684.
1134 See id. at 1687.
165 Id. at 1687-88.
106 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that a trial judge impermissibly closed a criminal trial
where there was no overriding interest to support closure that was articulated in the findings).
The Court declined "to define the circumstances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may
be closed to the public" while recognizing that the right of public access is not absolute. Id.
at 581 n.18.
167 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (holding that the closure of a seven-day suppression hearing was
unjustified). The Court "made clear that the right to an open trial may give way in certain
cases to other rights or interests, such as . . the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure
of sensitive information." Id. at 45.
168 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding that the guarantee of open public proceedings in
criminal trials extends to voir dire of potential witnesses). The Court stated that "Whe pre-
sumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 510.
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Admittedly, each of the above-cited cases has language that
recognizes that there is no absolute right of the press or public to
attend or have access to all aspects of a trial. Nevertheless, Professor
Jordan's movement from that proposition to the proposition that
the Constitution or public would accept as legitimate a secret trial
of high-ranking government officials accused of criminal miscon-
duct simply cannot be supported. Indeed, as soon as one moves
from the dicta of non-CIPA cases to application of her proposal to
CIPA-IC Statute cases, the inadequacies presented by such a pro-
posal surface.
For example, in deciding Richmond Newspapers, the Court ac-
knowledged "the importance of openness to the proper functioning
of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct
of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." 69
Public trials act as a check against public protest and outrage that
would follow a questionable outcome following a closed trial. "A
result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and
where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected
outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and
at worst has been corrupted.""°
The critical nature of the public's watchdog role arises in a
CIPA-IC Statute case. The defendant's special relationship with the
Executive Branch fosters a natural suspicion on the part of the
public that the defendant will receive favorable treatment as a result
of this special relationship. In Professor Jordan's proposal, the Ex-
ecutive Branch and employees with authorized access to classified
information will already have entered into an agreement that secret
trials could be held should one of the employees be accused of
criminal misconduct. This agreement would have occurred at the
time employees were given authorized access to classified informa-
tion. Indeed, these agreements would be mandatory for all security-
cleared individuals."'
Because approximately three million employees possess secu-
rity clearances for access to classified information, 172 there is a real
possibility that Professor Jordan's proposal could lead to two systems
169 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569.
' 7° Id. at 571.
171 See Jordan, supra note 137, at 1687.
"2 See id. at 1686 (citing Information Security Oversight Office, 1989 Report to the
White House, Mar. 26, 1990, at 29).
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of justice: one public and subject to public scrutiny for non-security-
cleared defendants (employing C.LP.A. as currently structured) and
one private and not subject to public scrutiny for security-cleared
defendants. 1 believe that courts would be unlikely to resolve First
Amendment constitutional challenges in favor of the Executive
Branch or the defendant under such a scenario.
The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial also
raises constitutional concerns with regard to Professor Jordan's
closed trial procedure. The Sixth Amendment operates to protect
the defendant by requiring public trials. Public trials serve the de-
fendant by decreasing the possibility of improper conduct by the
courts and the Executive Branch and by decreasing the risk that
witnesses will testify falsely.'" Professor Jordan's proposal antici-
pates that defendants might challenge closed trials on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds, but she suggests that waivers of this right at the time
individuals gain authorized access to classified information would
eliminate Sixth Amendment problems.
In my view, the waiver component of Professor Jordan's pro-
posal has two problems. First, it only covers individuals who had
authorized access to classified information. Therefore, it does noth-
ing to harmonize CIPA-IC Statute cases involving defendants who
never signed a waiver. Conspiracy cases involving non-security-
cleared and security-cleared defendants could not be held. Second,
with regard to those individuals who executed waivers, there is a
serious question whether these waivers would be considered "know-
ing" and "voluntary."
Professor Jordan compares her proposed Sixth Amendment
waiver proposal to non-disclosure agreements that prevent employ-
ees from disclosing sensitive information without prior consent of
the Executive Branch.' 74 Professor Jordan notes that the Executive
Branch has required employees with access to classified information
to sign non-disclosure agreements.'" She further notes that
"ralpproximately one-half of all civilian and military personnel—or
approximately three million persons—have signed one of these
forms."'" Finally, she cites a case for the proposition that signing
these non-disclosure agreements can constitute a waiver of one's
173 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257-71 (1948).
1" See Jordan, supra note 137, at 1684.
175 Id. at 1686 (citing Information Security Oversight Office, 1989 Report to the White
House, Mar. 26, 1990, at 29).
176 Id.
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First Amendment right to speak or write publicly about classified
information.'"
While I accept that courts will continue to consider non-disclo-
sure agreements to be permissible under the First Amendment, I
question whether the courts would interpret the Constitution to
treat similarly waiver of one's Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial. With regard to a person's waiver of his or her First Amend-
ment right, it is fairly easy for the person waiving this right to
predict and understand what a person is waiving and what such a
wiaver means. With regard to one's Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial, however, it is less clear at the time of the waiver what
one is waiving. Under Professor Jordan's proposal the waiver would
occur at the time the defendant received authorized access to clas-
sified information. At this point in time the defendant would be an
employee—either of the government or private industry working
on government contracts. There would be no particular set of
charges or facts against which the employee could evaluate the
impact of relinquishing her Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial.'" Moreover, the employee would not have benefit of counsel
to advise her about the ways in which such a waiver could affect
the employee's ability to get a fair trial.
For example, if an employee agrees to waive her right to a
public trial and agrees that the jurors who would constitute the
venire panel must be security-cleared, then the employee in effect
agrees that only security-cleared individuals may participate in the
trial.'" This means that if the employee (now defendant) has po-
tential witnesses who never had or no longer have security clear-
ance, these witnesses might not be able to participate or might
escape being cross-examined with classified information.'80 In ad-
dition, if the employee agrees to jury panels of security-cleared
individuals, she might not be able to strike people from the jury
177 See Alfred Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
1 ^8 Unlike a First Amendment waiver, which is clear at the time one waives it, the
significance of a Sixth Amendment waiver does not ripen until a particular set of charges or
facts develops.
179 The whole purpose of a closed trial involving security-cleared jurors, as proposed by
Professor Jordan, is to ensure that classified information is protected. Under Professor
Jordan's proposal, this classified information would already have been deemed by the Ex-
ecutive Branch and the court to be so sensitive that its disclosure would cause irreparable
harm to the national security. Therefore, it would make no sense to permit individuals who
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panel for cause based on their relationship with the intelligence and
military communities.' 8 '
Professor Jordan's proposal also presents obvious problems
with regard to whether the waiver of a public trial by an employee
would be considered "voluntary" under the Constitution. First, if a
current employee is required to sign such a waiver in order to retain
her job, a serious question of coercion arises. It is not hard to
imagine a court concluding that waiving one's right to an open and
fair trial by a jury of one's peers (including non-security-cleared
jurors) in order to keep one's job is an "involuntary" waiver under
the Constitution.'" Jobs are often considered essential by many
employees because a family's health and general well-being may
turn on the income jobs generate. Any waiver following an em-
ployee's being forced to decide between the real costs associated
with losing her job and the abstract costs associated with a Sixth
Amendment waiver could very often be considered coercive and
involuntary under the Constitution. Second, requiring a prospective
employee to waive his or her constitutional right to an open and
fair trial while presenting less categorical coercion problems could
in individual cases be held as not "voluntary" under the Constitu-
tion.'"
From a policy perspective Professor Jordan's three-part pro-
posal presents a more serious problem—the public's lack of confi-
dence in rulings during and verdicts following secret trials. In such
a case the public would be informed that defendants would be tried
by a jury consisting only of individuals with active security clearances
such as members of the intelligence communities. Furthermore, the
public would be informed that these trials would be held in secret.
Additionally, the public would be informed that at some point in
the past the Executive Branch and the defendant agreed that if the
defendant were ever charged criminally in a case involving classified
information the trial could be held in secret. But, the public would
not be informed about the specific facts, circumstances and evidence
"I Certainly, it is not difficult to conceive of situations where the very nature of the
criminal charges or potential defense is such that members of the intelligence or military
communities who have appropriate security clearance might be biased against certain defen-
dants.
'02 Professor Jordan recognizes that there are currently two to three million government
employees who would be required to sign such a waiver under her proposal or risk losing
their jobs. If her proposal does not apply to current employees, then it is of little practical
value at this time. '
183 These difficult economic times increase the waiver requirement's coercive impact on
prospective employees.
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that led to a given ruling or verdict because such information would
be classified.
Obviously, if there were a "classified" jury trial, it would require
extensive background and security clearance checks of the jurors.'"
This would provide many opportunities for abuse on the part of
the Executive Branch when it decided which jurors were "qualified"
to sit on the jury. In addition, jurors in closed trials may not be
capable of keeping disclosed information secret outside the court-
room. Finally, the public perception problem would be especially
acute in a closed trial. If there is any trial that should be held in an
open court, it would be the prosecution of high-ranking members
of the Executive Branch. The public would have no confidence in
the integrity of a closed-door trial in such a case.
IV. A BETTER IDEA: A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF AN OFFICE
OF INDEPENDENT SPECIAL ARBITER
In light of the conflicts that surfaced in the North and Fernandez
cases, and the flaws inherent in the proposed procedures discussed
above, another alternative must be found to resolve the dilemma
created by a CIPA-IC Statute case. As mentioned earlier, the best
solution for this dilemma must address concerns of public confi-
dence in the unbiased administration of criminal justice and con-
cerns for the protection of national security. Indeed, because the
problem centers on the public's distrust of the government's actions
in a CIPA-IC Statute case, the problem can be solved best by giving
the public some credible basis for forming judgments concerning
the Attorney General's motives. The creation of an Independent
Special Arbiter for classified information (the "ISA") to resolve
CIPA disputes between the Independent Counsel and the Attorney
General would accomplish this goal.
l84 Requiring security clearance for jurors would raise serious problems under the jury-
trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, both because of the potentially intimidating effects
of the security investigations involved and because of the dubious justification for narrowing
the "cross section" of the community by excluding venirepersons who cannot qualify for
clearance. CIPA security procedures simultaneously disavow the need for closed trial pro-
ceedings and expose their most obvious deficiencies: Inlothing contained in these procedures
shall be construed to require an investigation or security clearance of the members of the
jury or interfere with the functions of a jury, including access to classified information
introduced as evidence in the trial of a case." See Security Procedures Established Pursuant
to the Classified Information Procedures Act, Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat.
2025, by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Protection of Classified Information,
reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. § 9 at 708-09 (1988).
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Under an ISA procedure, the Attorney General is less likely to
file a section 6(e) affidavit under circumstances giving rise to public
suspicion, and the Independent Counsel will have an independent
entity to hear counterarguments against the need for the filing of
a section 6(e) affidavit. By creating the ISA, the competing interests
of the Attorney General and the Independent Counsel could be
integrated properly, because both officials would be able to safe-
guard their interests without public misperception of their mo-
tives. 185 Moreover, the goals of the IC Statute and CIPA could be
maximized in the process.
In order for the public to have confidence in the opinions of
the ISA, however, it is essential that the ISA be absolutely free from
the influence of either the Attorney General or the Independent
Counsel. The ISA must be qualified to make decisions regarding
classified information and national security. The only essential qual-
ification is sufficient prior experience with, or knowledge of, issues
relating to national security. Other factors should also be consid-
ered, including the absence of close ties with both the current
administration and the Independent Counsel, past intelligence ex-
perience that may result in a biased perspective concerning classified
information, and the absence of political connections that might
influence or appear to influence the ISA's determinations.' 86 It may
also be desirable to attach post-employment restrictions to the po-
sition, such as barring ISAs from holding any Executive-appointed
office for a period of ten years after the expiration of their term as
ISA.
The ISA may be removable by the Attorney General for
cause.'87 In addition, the ISA should have a limited term of office.
An ISA will be appointed after an Independent Counsel has been
185 This article accepts the proposition that there are certain prosecutions that must be
brought by some entity other than the Department of justice in order to avoid the appearance
of impropriety. The author is reluctant to endorse the creation of another "part" of the
Executive Branch. Nevertheless, the author believes that the current simultaneous operation
of the IC Statute and CIPA proves the proposition that two halves do not necessarily make
a whole. The creation of an ISA will combine with the IC Statute and CIPA to make them
whole.
as It is of paramount importance to find a qualified person to serve as the ISA, but the
very factors that make such a person qualified might also be viewed as making her biased in
favor of the intelligence communities. That is, if a person is qualified because she worked in
the CIA for twenty years, she might be deemed an inappropriate selection because of her
ties to the CIA. Therefore, the search could begin in the academic community, where the
appearance of bias problem would probably be less serious.
181 This would help to define the ISA as an "inferior" officer with the meaning of Article
I I.
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named. In order for the ISA to be appointed, the Independent
Counsel or the Attorney General must file an affidavit with the
Special Division stating that he or she reasonably expects classified
information to be disclosed at trial. The ISA would then have
jurisdiction over the Independent Counsel's case and the cases of
all other subsequent Independent Counsel appointments, as long
as either a subsequent Independent Counsel or the Attorney Gen-
eral also petitioned the ISA to review a conflict concerning the
disclosure of classified information.
As long as the first Independent Counsel's case is ongoing, it
would not be necessary for any succeeding Independent Counsel
to file an affidavit with the court.' 88
 But the succeeding Independent
Counsel, or the Attorney General, would have to petition the ISA
prior to the resolution of the first Independent Counsel case in
order to come within the ISA's jurisdiction. Thus, if a second In-
dependent Counsel or the Attorney General petitions the ISA prior
to the termination of the first case, the ISA would also have juris-
diction over the second case. The ISA would retain this jurisdiction
over the second case even after the original case ends. While the
ISA has jurisdiction over a case, it would not be necessary for the
Attorney General or any other Independent Counsel to file an
affidavit.
When an Independent Counsel case ends, the ISA's term of
office would be complete if there were no other Independent Coun-
sel cases outstanding over which the ISA had jurisdiction. The ISA's
term of office would in any event be limited to ten years, with the
possibility that it could expire earlier. 189 If the ten year period
expires and there are still cases over which the ISA has jurisdiction,
a new ISA would be appointed to take over. After the ten year
period has expired, or if the ISA's office terminates earlier because
of the conclusion of all IC Statute cases over which she acquired
jurisdiction, a new ISA would be appointed. This replacement ISA
would be appointed in the same fashion as the first one, that is,
when an Independent Counsel or the Attorney General files an
'"" By allowing the ISA to have jurisdiction over these cases without requiring the
Independent Counsel to file an affidavit, we would conserve judicial resources. There is no
reason to involve the court once an ISA properly has jurisdiction over other cases.
'"9
 These factors would further make the ISA akin to Independent Counsel within the
holding of Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), so as to enable the ISA also to be called
"inferior." See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text. Yet there would be no problem
with allowing an ISA to serve more than one term. So long as each individual term is less
than ten years, the Office of ISA might still be called "inferior."
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affidavit stating that he or she reasonably expects that classified
information will be disclosed at trial. The new ISA would have
jurisdiction over cases in the same manner as his predecessor. This
system would result in the appointment of only one ISA at a time.
The ISA's duties would consist of issuing advisory opinions when-
ever the Attorney General and the Independent Counsel disagree
about the disclosure of classified information.' 90
The 1SA's opinions would be advisory because the Executive
Branch must retain control over the information that can and can-
not be disclosed due to national security considerations. The Attor-
ney General answers to the President, who in turn answers to the
public through the election process. It is proper for the President
to retain control over decisions that could threaten national security
because the public has declared, by electing her to this office, that
the ultimate decision for the safety of our nation ought to rest with
her.
Because the ISA's opinions would be strictly advisory, her opin-
ions would only advise the Independent Counsel, the Attorney
General and the public that national security either would or would
not be threatened by the disclosure of the classified information in
question.' 9 ' The public is currently quite distrustful of the Attorney
General's motives,' 92 yet, it has no evidence to support this distrust,
only suspicions. If the public were confronted with the advisory
opinion of the ISA stating that the disclosure of certain classified
information would not compromise national security, the Attorney
General's decision to file a CIPA section 6(e) affidavit to prevent
disclosure would carry with it a potentially high political cost. The
pressure on the Executive Branch could even result in a withdrawal
of the section 6(e) affidavit. Thus, even though the opinions are
advisory they would carry great weight.
The ISA would have authority to issue opinions only when the
Attorney General and the Independent Counsel disagree about
whether a section 6(e) affidavit can be supported on the grounds
of a threat to national security. The ISA will confront disagreements
only where the Attorney General takes the position that a section
190
	
this limited duty of the ISA would make the ISA very similar to the Inde-
pendent Counsel for purposes of the Morrison holding. See infra notes 198-206 and accom-
panying text.
Lgi By giving the ISA advisory power only, the legislative intent behind the Independent
Counsel Statute would not be frustrated, because Congress intended to give the Independent
Counsel the prosecutorial powers and an advisory opinion would not usurp those powers.
194 See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
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6(e) affidavit can be supported on the grounds of irreparable harm
to national security, and the Independent Counsel disagrees.'" Be-
cause the Executive Branch would be the party seeking to withhold
information from the Independent Counsel and is deemed to be in
a conflict with regard to the handling of the case as evidenced by
the appointment of an Independent Counsel, the Executive Branch
should bear the burden of persuasion. Nevertheless, the Executive
Branch's standard should not be a preponderance of evidence stan-
dard as has been suggested by one commentator.'" Instead, the
ISA should determine whether the Executive Branch's assertion
that public disclosure of classified information would cause irrepar-
able harm to national security is supported by the evidence, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The
purpose of the ISA's review function is to ensure that the Executive
Branch's CIPA section 6(e) claims are legitimate and to discourage
the Executive Branch from making insupportable claims of irre-
parable harm to national security. Every time the ISA is petitioned,
he or she would be required to render an opinion deciding the
question and stating publicly whether the Attorney General's or
Independent Counsel's position was untenable or even frivolous.' 95
The ISA's decision as to whether or not disclosure would com-
promise national security would aid the public in assessing the
Attorney General's motives. Thus, the public would be rightfully
suspicious if the Attorney General filed a section 6(e) affidavit after
the ISA issued an advisory opinion stating that the disclosure of the
information would not be harmful to national security. On the other
hand, if the Attorney General filed a section 6(e) affidavit when the
ISA agreed that the disclosure of classified information would
195
 Obviously, if the independent counsel believes that the § 6(e) affidavit can be sup-
ported on the grounds of a threat to national security, then the independent counsel would
not be in a conflict with the Executive Branch about the public disclosure of the classified
information.
194 See Jordan, supra note 137, at 1680 (disputes between the Independent Counsel and
the Executive Branch ought to be resolved by the court, and the Executive Branch bears the
burden of proving its case by a preponderance of evidence standard).
195
 The ISA would not issue any opinions regarding CIPA § 6(a) hearings. In a § 6(a)
hearing, the court is to rule on admissibility alone, without considering the classified nature
of the information until the § 6(c) substitution hearings. If information is found admissible
in a § 6(a) hearing, it does not necessarily mean that the information will be disclosed, but
only that it is relevant. It is possible that the information may still be protected adequately
by using substitutions. The ISA cannot issue opinions concerning the relevance and admis-
sibility of evidence, even classified evidence, as this would infringe upon the powers of the
court. Determinations of relevance and admissibility are purely judicial functions, over which
the ISA is not qualified to issue an opinion.
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threaten national security, the public would have less reason to be
suspicious of the Attorney General's motives.
The office of ISA must be structured to withstand challenges
to its constitutionality. Recently, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the IC Statute in Morrison v. Olson.' 96 By mod-
eling the office of the ISA after the office of the Independent
Counsel, the office of the ISA would likewise be able to withstand
challenges to its constitutional validity.
In Morrison v. Olson, the IC Statute withstood three separate
challenges to its constitutionality based on the Appointments
Clause,' 97 Article 111, 198 and the separation of powers doctrine. 199
An Article III challenge is unlikely to succeed in the wake of Mor-
rison, which upheld the power of the Special Division to appoint the
Independent Counsel on a theory that would likewise uphold the
power of the Special Division to appoint the ISA. 20° Further, the
Morrison Court sustained the Ethics in Government Act against a
separation of powers challenge, concluding that the Act did not
represent a usurpation of the Executive Branch's functions by either
Congress or the judiciary. 2°' It is likely that the Court would also
196 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). For an interesting discussion of this problem,
see Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A Modest Assessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1989).
ig' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
198 U.S. Coml.. art. HI.
199 The Supreme Court has explained the significance of separation of powers doctrine:
Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme
of the separation of government powers into the three coordinate branches .
[T]he system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the
Constitution was regarded by the Framers as "a self-executing safeguard against
the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other."
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
2°° An Article III challenge would focus on whether the judiciary is permitted to intrude
on an executive function through the appointment of an independent Counsel who would
be authorized to discharge executive functions. This appointment by the judiciary would in
effect prevent the "Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695.
2° 1 In holding that the Ethics in Government Act (the IC Statute) as a whole does not
violate the principle of separation of powers, the Morrison Court said that "[w]e observe first
that this case does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the
expense of the Executive Branch." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694. Under the Act, Congress can:
request the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an [I]ndependent
[C]ounsel, but the Attorney General has no duty to comply with the request
.... Other than that, Congress' role under the Act is limited to receiving reports
or other information and oversight of the independent counsel's activities[,] .
functions that we have recognized generally as being incidental to the legislative
function of Congress.
Id. In holding that "the Act works [no] judicial usurpation of properly Executive functions,"
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find that the office of the ISA does not violate the principle of the
separation of powers because the ISA would have the power to issue
advisory decisions only. Therefore, the primary consideration in
structuring the office of the ISA would be to ensure that it does
not violate the Appointments Clause.
The Appointments Clause distinguishes between two types of
officers, "principal" and "inferior" officers. 202 The Appointments
Clause provides in part that "the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments."203 In order for the Special Division to have the power to
appoint an ISA, therefore, that person must be deemed an inferior
officer. As the Morrison Court noted, "the line between 'inferior'
and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear." 2" The Court
considered several factors in determining that the Independent
Counsel was an inferior officer. These factors included recognition
that the Independent Counsel is removable by the Attorney Gen-
eral, that the Independent Counsel is "empowered . . . to perform
only certain, limited duties," that the Independent Counsel is lim-
ited in jurisdiction and that the office of Independent Counsel is
temporary.205 The Court stated that "[On our view, these factors
relating to the 'ideas of tenure, duration . . . and duties' of the
[I]ndependent [C]ounsel . . . are sufficient to establish that [the
Independent Counsel] is an 'inferior' officer in the constitutional
sense."206 Because the ISA would be modeled after the Independent
Counsel, the ISA should be considered an inferior officer. There-
fore, the Appointments Clause does not represent a constitutional
bar to the establishment of an office of the ISA.
The creation of an office of the ISA would hopefully result in
fewer conflicts between the Attorney General and the Independent
Counsel. Although conflicts are still bound to arise, the ISA's ad-
visory opinions would potentially prompt the Independent Counsel
and the Attorney General to resolve their conflicts without having
the Court emphasized that the Special Division can appoint an Independent Counsel only if
the Attorney General requests one. Id. at 695. It also noted that the Attorney General has
the power to remove the Independent Counsel, but only for cause. Id. at 695-96.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, 2, cl. 2. In Morrison, the Supreme Court read "principal" into
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 by implication.
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to resort to filing a section 6(e) affidavit. In those instances where
the Attorney General does decide to file a section 6(e) affidavit, the
ISA's opinion would allow the public to make a more informed
judgment as to the necessity for the affidavit, thereby reestablishing
public confidence in the prosecution of high-ranking members of
the Executive Branch. Similarly, if the public has confidence in the
Attorney General's decisions, there will be less danger that the
Attorney General will disclose classified information solely to avoid
questions of impropriety.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the simultaneous operation
of CIPA and the IC Statute undermines public confidence in our
system of government and endangers national security. Any deci-
sion by the Attorney General to interrupt the prosecution of a
member of the Executive Branch by filing a CIPA section 6(e)
affidavit will arouse public suspicion. To avoid questions of impro-
priety, the Executive Branch might permit the public disclosure of
classified information and the prosecution of these officials, even
when doing so would threaten national security. Thus, two statutes
that were enacted to ensure public confidence in our system of
justice and safeguard national security combine to do just the op-
posite. This result is antithetical to Congress's intent in enacting
CIPA and the IC Statute.
Public confidence can be restored by providing the Indepen-
dent Counsel and the Attorney General a forum in which to resolve
disputes concerning the release of classified information. The cre-
ation of the Independent Special Arbiter would provide the Attor-
ney General and the Independent Counsel with an informed, neu-
tral official who would issue an advisory opinion on whether the
filing of a section 6(e) affidavit is necessary to protect national
security and foreign relations. Thus, creation of the ISA would
integrate the dichotomous objectives of the Attorney General and
the Independent Counsel by removing from both the ability to make
a decision concerning national security without having the legiti-
macy of that decision subject to review by an independent entity.
The creation of an ISA provides a reliable way of ensuring that
neither national security nor public confidence in our system of
justice suffers as the result of the prosecution of a member of the
Executive Branch by an Independent Counsel.
